

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**PROPERLY APPLYING THE MILITARY DECISION
MAKING PROCESS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND
SMALL SCALE CONTINGENCIES**

by

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June 2001

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LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND SMALL SCALE CONTINGENCIES**

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
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
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


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


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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that current doctrine, applied effectively, is more than adequate to the task of providing military planners the flexibility needed to develop plans and prosecute campaigns in the Low Intensity Conflict/Small Scale Contingency (LIC/SSC) arena.

Most of the writing about the supposed inefficacy of our present doctrine deals with the *structure*, and "*mind-set*" of the military establishment. Suggested solutions presently range from fixing the problem through scaling down conventional units (currently reflected in the push for the medium brigade), to arguments made for flattening the present command infrastructure and adopting new doctrines made possible through the development of information warfare (IW) assets, capabilities, and technology.

We argue in this thesis that the problem, however, is not with the doctrine, but with its application. The change of mind we advocate would have the Army learn how to accomplish its tasks by applying the same tools but in a different way. We believe that the key to properly utilizing present doctrine lies in a three-fold solution incorporating information management, education, and training.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|--------|---|
| AI | Area of Interest |
| AO | Area of Operations |
| AWE | Advanced Warfighting Experiment |
| CA | Civil Affairs |
| CCC | Captain's Career Course |
| CCIR | Commander's Critical Intelligence Requirements |
| CINC | Commander IN Chief |
| CJTF | Commander, Joint Task Force |
| CMOC | Civil Military Operations Center |
| CLT | Counter Leadership Targeting |
| CAN | Center for Naval Analyses |
| COA | Course Of Action |
| DOJ | Department of Justice |
| EEFI | Essential Elements of Friendly Information |
| FFIR | Friendly Forces Intelligence Requirements |
| FRAGO | Fragmentary Order |
| ICITAP | International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program |
| IPB | Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield |
| IR | Intelligence Requirements |
| IAW | Inter Agency Working group |
| IW | Information Warfare |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| JTF | Joint Task Force |
| LBE | Load Bearing Equipment |
| LIC | Low Intensity Conflict |
| LNO | Liaison Officer |
| MCOO | Military Combined Operations Overlay |
| MDMP | Military Decision Making Process |
| NCA | National Command Authority |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| OAKOC | Observation and fields of fire, Avenues of approach, Key terrain, Obstacle, Cover and concealment |
| OOC | Ornery Old Coot |

| | |
|---------|--|
| ODA | Operational Detachment Alpha |
| OPLAN | Operation Plan |
| PIR | Priority Intelligence Requirement |
| PDD | Presidential Decision Directive |
| POI | Program Of Instruction |
| PSYOP | Psychological Operations |
| PVO | Private Volunteer Organization |
| RCPA | Relative Combat Power Analysis |
| SFG | Special Forces Group |
| SOF | Special Operations Forces |
| SSC | Small Scale Contingencies |
| TF | Task Force |
| TTP | Tactics, Techniques and Procedures |
| UNMIH | United Nations Mission In Haiti |
| UNOSOM | United Nations Operation -- Somalia |
| USACOM | United States Atlantic Command |
| USSOCOM | United States Special Operations Command |

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that current doctrine, applied effectively, is more than adequate to the task of providing military planners the flexibility needed to develop plans and prosecute campaigns in the Low Intensity Conflict/Small Scale Contingency (LIC/SSC) arena. We chose this arena because the preponderance of United States involvement in the foreseeable future will be in this venue: one in which accomplishing objectives does not include defeating an army in the field. The occasions when we can use "blunt force" will be fewer than those in which we will enter a permissive or semi-permissive environment to accomplish national goals/objectives – where force is an *adjunct* rather than a mainstay. It is in these situations that a greater degree of political awareness and cultural sensitivity is required, especially since force has the potential to be counter productive to our goals in the long run.

While the concepts in this thesis are applicable for the military planner at any level, the target audience includes those planners at the Battalion or Brigade level. By virtue of the LIC/SSC environment, planners at this level are now compelled to take a broader view of the situation at hand. Indeed, the levels at which they operate are exactly where the first cracks in the operational edifice will appear, where seemingly innocuous local actions can produce far reaching unintended national and international consequences. Also, by virtue of being on the ground, planners at Battalion and Brigade levels are in a position to understand local problems and the complexities they create better than are those who would offer a solution from afar.

At the same time, as imperative as it is to be sensitive to the political side of an operation and gain as thorough an understanding of policy makers' objectives as possible, it is even more critical to understand how one's actions may influence the operation. In his seminal work on political versus military control in ongoing operations, COL (Ret) Lloyd Matthews makes the salient point that

...the first and foremost requirement for the soldier, if he is ever to achieve operational autonomy, is to convince his political masters that he understands the political aims behind the contemplated military action and that he will conduct the military action in a manner calculated to achieve those aims. (Matthews, 1998, p. 26)

Matthews cites numerous examples of National Command Authority (NCA) involvement with tactical and operational issues, brought about oftentimes because the "political masters" (p. 24) are not comfortable that the commander on the ground is either tuned into the "political realities" (p. 24), or, that he or she will take those realities into consideration when developing operations and contingency plans. With this requirement in mind, military planners, and commanders at all levels need to understand the constraints that LIC and/or SSC impose.

The fact that we, as soldiers, have to get it right with regard to plans that meet the policy makers'/NCA's intent while still accomplishing the mission creates inherent tensions. Dr. David Tucker (Tucker, 2001) noted during a lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School that diplomats frequently tend to dislike military involvement in the planning process because once members of the military get involved they begin making plans, which then, more often than not,

become etched in stone, and thus limit to some extent the flexibility that the State Department would prefer. Additionally, military intervention is but one way to react to a situation. Whereas diplomacy, when it is effective, is open-ended and continuous, military operations have definite start points and, with any luck, defined end points. Putting together a coherent military plan in a political environment where, as Robert McNamara quipped at the end of the Cuban missile crisis, "There is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management" (Matthews, 1998, p. 20), demands the ability to effectively tie military planning and action to political and diplomatic machinations *and retain the flexibility to tailor the military response appropriately to maintain that tie with ongoing political and diplomatic efforts*. Nothing is more important.

Equally essential as sensitivity to, and an understanding of, the political situation, is sensitivity to and an understanding of the culture and psychology of *all* players in the theater of operations: including allies, various private volunteer organizations (PVOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the population of the target country. In situations where we have either been invited in, or have invited ourselves in, and the situation is either permissive or semi-permissive – in other words, where our aims are to be gained primarily through diplomacy and by convincing the population that what we want for them is in their own best interests, as opposed to coercive diplomacy at the point of a gun – factoring cultural and societal considerations into the military decision making process (MDMP) is absolutely critical. When these considerations are not

factored in, or when the wrong conclusions are drawn, the operation fails absolutely.

II. THE SITUATION

Given a set of tools, one can make a variety of different shapes; the same principle applies to the MDMP. The MDMP used improperly will turn out only one size and shape of an item. Then, when that "item" does not fit the requirement, the complaints begin: "our present doctrine does not work in SSC", "we should change our doctrine", or one hears the alternative accusation that "we are being hamstrung by our doctrine." Yet, in such circumstances, it is the carpenter who is to blame, not the tool kit. Much as it is a piss-poor carpenter who blames his tools, it is a piss-poor planner who blames "doctrine" for operational shortcomings. As this thesis sets out to prove, the doctrinal tool kit is sufficient if properly and skillfully used. The MDMP allows planners to take into account societal variables no matter the cultural environment in which they find themselves, and to tailor a military approach that fits the situation through a thorough understanding of the local conditions.

A. IDENTIFYING THE NEED

Like it or not, the military does not have the exclusive mission of fighting wars. These days there is an ever greater tendency toward peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and SSC, as well as LIC. Weaponry under development includes non-lethal arms to a degree not previously seen. For better or worse the military, as the de facto leader or the initial planning agency for operations that, although they may start with the military, end up as civic action, has a responsibility to ensure that it does not make the follow-on job of other agencies more difficult by failing to use foresight as it develops its plans.

The objective of a campaign plan is to "provide unified focus and clear direction for military operations, *and to link those military operations to the other elements of national power: diplomacy, economic tools, and information management*" (Ballard, 1998, p. 64) (italics the authors'). If the campaign plans or the operation plans (OPLANs) do not address the "national" objectives, but instead simply offer the exit strategy for the military as a separate entity, then not only has the military made the job of follow-on agencies more difficult, but it could add to the time that the United States is involved: hence, it could be responsible for the overall failure of the mission, as in the case of Somalia. As the lead-off agency with a limited role in the overall mission, but whose initial actions color the rest of the mission, the military has a responsibility to ensure that its initial actions and plans do in fact form a "link...to the other elements of national power: diplomacy, economic tools, and information management" (p. 64).

The "off-the-shelf" operations plans (OPLANs) all focus on the purely military side of a conventional war, with good reason. Many of the factors important to fighting and winning a war change very little, if at all, over time. However, in a LIC/SSC scenario, the importance of factors other than military increases by orders of magnitude and must be developed with the same attention to detail paid military factors in any conventional OPLAN. This understanding of the 180-degree difference between the prosecution of conventional war and LIC/SSC is established loud and clear in the report from the Center for Naval Analyses' (CNA) 1995 conference:

...the military is frequently placed in situations where warfighting will not accomplish the mission. And military leaders often find that

the real requirements of the operation differ from those of their mission. (McGrady & Smith, 1998, p. 5)

This hints at a messy real world, in which one must deal with the situation as it exists, like it or not. It is possible, in fact probable, to win the war but lose the peace if military planners do not see past their noses, and past the most expedient means of meeting tactical or operational requirements, to take into account the possible long-term impacts of their actions, and plan accordingly. For instance, in Albania in 1998 a Battalion Commander gave an order to remove trees that were interfering with his fields of fire, an order that was complied with. Chainsaws were brought out and the offending trees were felled. The backlash from this action was immediate and damaging to the conduct of the mission. The commander had conveyed to his people previously that he considered himself and his battalion to be "at war". Was the United States at war? Were not the Americans in fact guests of the country? The issue was less that the trees were removed and more that no apparent thought was given to determining an alternative solution. Given the commander's skewed vision of his purpose for being in the country, the trees were in the way; the trees were cut down. Clearing fields of fire is unquestionably a commander's prerogative and is, in fact, his or her responsibility, if this is what is called for by the tactical situation. However, in the context of the situation at the time in Albania, such a move was deemed gratuitous by the Battalion Commander's higher command, and rightly so.

B. DEVELOPING A TURN OF MIND

The imperative for always having an exit strategy emerged as a result of our experiences in Vietnam, and was subsequently codified in the Weinberger doctrine. We in the military generally like this; it keeps things neat, rather black and white. We know what our mission is when we go in (the start point). We know what we're going to do, and in what order (the phases of the operation). And we know when to stop fighting and go home (the end point), so we like to try to sequence our response. However, in doing so we conveniently fool ourselves into regarding the military's mission as a separate phase, and ignoring the fact that it is tied to others' efforts. This causes us to use words and phrases like "termination" and "end state" and "exit strategy" – all implying and conveying to those who use and hear such terms the impression that there is a clean end to our involvement when, in fact, there is not. There is no "end." What there is is a *transition* from mostly-military operations to diplomatic operations.

Clausewitz described war as diplomacy via other means. But as he would be the first to point out, war is still diplomacy. The term "coercive diplomacy" addresses precisely this point: that force, or the threatened use of force, must be considered adjunct to, not in lieu of, continued diplomatic efforts to resolve a situation. Since what the military in effect does is jump into the middle (both in a temporal and linear sense) of an on-going diplomatic operation, we in the military have a responsibility to ensure that the planning that we do for our portion of the overall operation – the restoration and continuation of diplomacy – is compatible with on-going and future diplomatic efforts. When we do not incorporate our

portion of the mission into the broader diplomatic objective, we oftentimes create additional problems.

Most of the writing about the supposed inefficacy of our present doctrine deals with the *structure*, and “*mind-set*” of the military establishment. Suggested solutions presently range from fixing the problem through scaling down conventional units (currently reflected in the push for the medium brigade), to arguments made for flattening the present command infrastructure and adopting new doctrines under the rubric of “swarming” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2000), made possible through the development of information warfare (IW) assets, capabilities, and technology. The counter-arguments for each of these, meanwhile, are as well thought out as are the arguments for them.

In contrast, the change of mind we advocate in this thesis, would have the Army learn how to accomplish its same tasks by applying the same tools but in a different way. Our doctrine – and the MDMP – is sufficient. The *principles* that Clausewitz espoused in the 1800’s are timeless, fundamental and, as such, are as valid today as they were when he espoused them. It is *how* those principles are applied which has changed – and arguably should change with the times and technology. For instance, mass as applied to IW may mean simultaneous computer attacks against the *schwerpunkt*, as opposed to a company of light infantry massing for an attack.

But in addition to changes in *our* capabilities, there have been, and will continue to be, changes in both our adversaries and their tactics. Modern day “guerrillas” have benefited greatly from the inception of the internet, as evidenced

by the Zapatistas who kept “the Mexican government and army on the defensive for several years by means of aggressive but peaceful information operations” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, p. 2). Moreover, as Arquilla and Ronfeldt point out, the Zapatistas in no way have a corner on the market:

...networked nonstate actors, particularly those associated with a nascent global civil society, may raise political and social challenges and opportunities that differ radically from those we have traditionally confronted, or desired. (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, p. 3)

Thus, as we reexamine the military’s role in LIC/SSC – or more accurately, how the military *views* its role – we come to the second reason we advocate a change of mind. For instance, although Figure 1 (seen below) is meant to reflect the “Range of [potential] Military Operations.”

| STATES OF THE ENVIRONMENT | GOAL | MILITARY OPERATIONS | EXAMPLES |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------|---|
| WAR | Fight and Win | WAR | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large-scale combat operations... • Attack • Defend |
| CONFLICT | Deter War and Resolve Conflict | OTHER THAN WAR | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strikes and raids • Peace enforcement • Support to insurgency • Antiterrorism • Peacekeeping • NEO |
| PEACETIME | Promote Peace | OTHER THAN WAR | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Counterdrug • Disaster relief • Civil support • Peace building • Nation assistance |

The states of peacetime, conflict, and war could all exist at once in the theater commander's strategic environment. He can respond to requirements with a wide range of military operations. Noncombat operations might occur during war, just as some operations other than war might require combat.

Figure 2-1. Range of Military Operations in the Theater Strategic Environment

Figure 1. “Range of Military Operations”. From Ref. FM 100-5

this title is misleading in a subtle, yet extremely important way. "Military Operations" conveys the message that the military is "in charge" – and that it is the entity running the show and setting the conditions. In fact, it would be more accurate to describe military involvement in the operations listed under "Peacetime Examples" (counterdrug, etc.) as "Operations in Which the Military May Play a Part", with heavy emphasis on the word "part." In operations such as these the military is working *with* someone, *for* someone, and therefore must ensure that it is meeting the "commander's intent" of the agency which *does* have the lead. Far too often the military adopts the approach of, "you called for us, now get out of the way and let us do our job", rather than, "you called for us, what is it that you want us to help you to accomplish?"

The turn of mind that must be developed involves a broadening of the analytical horizons beyond the convention of set-piece battles, with their numbers of soldiers, tanks, and planes all neatly tied together by the attrition coefficients of the Lanchester Combat Model. We believe this necessitates a reconsideration of the proper usage of the MDMP. The focus of the next chapter is on using the MDMP in LIC/SSC scenarios.

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III. THE MDMP AND CURRENT DOCTRINE

The MDMP “drives” the application of doctrine – problems transpire when the reverse occurs. By design, current doctrine is sufficiently structured and flexible enough to allow planners to formulate solutions to any problem (mission, operation, battle, campaign) at hand, as this excerpt from the opening paragraph of FM 100-5 demonstrates:

As an authoritative statement, doctrine must be definitive enough to guide specific operations, yet remain adaptable enough to address diverse and varied situations worldwide” (FM 100-5, 1993, p. 1-1).

Formulating solutions for LIC/SSC or peace operations is unique and, in many ways, more challenging than determining solutions for conventional operations. FM 100-23, Peace Operations (1994) reinforces this point as it states:

The complex environment, changing circumstances, and multinational and political dynamics of peace operations complicate planning. The planning process itself is the same as for other types of operations, but considerations and emphasis may be different. (p. 3-1)

This chapter will identify the unique planning considerations for the LIC/SSC environment by discussing the unique LIC/SSC planning considerations as they apply to the seven steps of the MDMP. The chapter assumes the reader is familiar with the MDMP as outlined in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations (1997), and illustrated on the following page. The intent of this chapter is not to provide an explanation of the seven steps of the MDMP and each of the step’s components. Rather, the chapter uses the framework of the




Figure 2: The Framework of the MDMP. After Ref. FM 101-5

MDMP as a means to discuss the unique planning considerations and highlight areas that may require additional or different emphases in a LIC/SSC environment if one hopes to prepare a viable plan or solution.

A. STEP 1 OF THE MDMP: RECEIPT OF MISSION

Time management is critical in any military operation, but perhaps most critical in the LIC/SSC environment. LIC/SSC operations are more likely to have a diverse task organization than more conventional operations, including in their composition PVOs, NGOs, coalition partners (to include NATO and UN forces), and inter-agency elements. These organizations cannot, nor should they be expected to, plan, prepare, and execute at the same pace as the United States military.

Effectively integrating non-military organizations into the MDMP through parallel planning can compensate for some of the differences in planning and preparation capabilities:

Warning orders facilitate parallel planning. Parallel planning means that several echelons will be working on their MDMP concurrently. This is essential to speed up the process for subordinate units and allow subordinates the maximum time to conduct their own planning. Parallel planning relies on accurate and timely warning orders and a full sharing of information between echelons as it becomes available. Parallel planning is a routine procedure for the MDMP. (FM 101-5, 1997, p. 5-5)

While the US military is good at parallel planning in-house, to be as effective as it can be in the LIC/SSC environment it must include other organizations in the process. Including the appropriate people and agencies concurrently, or *jointly*, in the planning process can only help with the follow-on steps of the MDMP – giving military planners insight into the areas that are typically dismissed or ignored, but that can, and should, be integrated into mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, analysis, comparison, and the subsequent orders production process.

B. STEP 2 OF THE MDMP: MISSION ANALYSIS

1. Mission

The failure to understand/integrate intent, a concept of operations, and the mission of the commander two levels higher into the analysis and solution process leads to the failure to understand specified tasks, a failure to identify implied tasks, and the inability to comprehend constraints – all of which result in deriving an inaccurate restated mission.

The above phenomenon causes problems in any type of operation, but it can have a compounding effect in LIC/SSC operations. Without a clearly stated and understood strategic intent, concept of operations, and mission, the ability to synchronize the efforts of numerous diverse organizations at the operational and tactical levels becomes exceedingly difficult, as described in FM 100-23, Peace Operations:

Transitions may involve the transfers of certain responsibilities to nonmilitary civil agencies. NGOs and PVOs may be responsible for the ultimate success of the peace operation, perhaps with significant US support, to include military forces. Transitions in peace operations may have no clear division between combat and peacetime activities, they may lack timetables for transferring responsibilities, and be conducted in a fluid, increasingly political environment. (p. 3-3)

If planners do not clearly understand the higher command's intent, concept of operation, and mission, as well as the roles various military and non-military organizations will play in the upcoming operation, the remainder of the planning process is prone to failure.

The LIC/SSC operation conducted in Somalia illustrates this well. President Bush described the initial US mission (Operation Restore Hope) in the following way:

Our mission has a limited objective – to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a U.N. peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay longer than is absolutely necessary. (Carpenter, 1992)

Were the mission and intent clearly understood? Were the actions of all military and non-military participants clearly tied to accomplishing the mission and intent? Did the “division between combat and peacetime activities” cause problems in Somalia? Was the Somalia operation “conducted in a fluid, [and] increasingly political environment?” We believe the answers to these questions highlight the importance mission factors hold for generating effective planning in the LIC/SSC environment.

2. Enemy

a. Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

A failure to fully understand factors such as tradition, culture, hierarchy, and societal control processes or mechanisms during mission analysis directly contributes to a failure to adequately understand the enemy's current activities, which in turn can lead to an inability to predict the enemy's reactions during COA development and analysis. Doctrine recognizes the importance of understanding an adversary's cultural and traditional differences as FM 100-5 states:

Understanding cultural differences is important if friendly forces are to establish the military conditions necessary to achieve strategic goals. (FM 100-5, 1993, p. 1-1)

But while doctrine recognizes the importance that cross-cultural understanding plays in accomplishing strategic objectives, cultural differences are not always considered, or taken into account during the planning process. The problem is not the “framework” – the IPB remains a suitable framework for facilitating integration of cultural differences into the LIC/SSC planning process, as we will see – the problem is emphasizing the relevant LIC / SSC points *within* the framework. The following discussion of the four steps of the IPB illustrates some of the points that should be emphasized to properly integrate cultural differences into the planning process.

b. Step 1 of the IPB: Define the Battlefield Environment.

Defining the battlefield environment—the area of operations (AO) and the area of influence (AI) — requires a more expansive analysis, or emphasis, for LIC/SSC operations than for more conventional operations. In LIC/SSC operations analysts cannot limit intelligence requirements (IR) in their assigned AO to the adversary’s “uniformed military”, or to aspects of the infrastructure that hold “traditional” military utility only. Accounting for the “uniformed military” within the AO allows analysts to begin to understand their environment, but analysts will never fully comprehend the LIC/SSC environment unless they expand their IR to what some might consider “non–military” issues.

For example, defining a LIC/SSC environment thoroughly will include gaining an understanding of such things as traditional infrastructures and

sources of power, ethnic backgrounds, religious beliefs, political loyalties, transportation networks, food distribution methods, and economic practices or exchange relationships, to name but a few (FM 100-23, p. 4-6).

Understanding the area of influence (AI) in the LIC/SSC environment also encompasses understanding more expansive, and quite often more complex, sets of issues. An AO is something that is assigned or stated by a higher headquarters, so an AO has discernable boundaries. By definition, an AI has no prescribed boundaries, as it is the area outside of an AO that may affect the upcoming operation. The areas or topics that require special or additional emphasis for understanding the battlefield environment make the implications of understanding the AI especially important in the LIC/SSC environment.

At the strategic level, areas of operation will likely reflect, or somehow coincide with, the borders of independent countries. This can pose a problem for planners as they attempt to determine the AI in the LIC/SSC battlefield environment. Ethnic heritage and allegiances, traditional infrastructures, and religious beliefs are just a few of the areas requiring special emphasis in the LIC/SSC environment because these are hardly restricted by, and often transcend, national borders.

c. Step 2 of the IPB: Describe the Battlefield's Effects

Understanding the effects of terrain is a must to adequately describe the effects of the battlefield. Terrain analysis in the LIC/SSC environment must encompass more than the traditional military aspects of

terrain: obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, observation and fields of fire, and cover and concealment (OAKOC). To fully understand the battlefield effects one must think in terms of the socio-cultural terrain as well.

To describe the battlefield effects in the LIC/SSC setting, planners must anticipate how such factors as ethnic allegiances, religious groups, and traditional practices may affect or play a role in the LIC/SSC operation at hand. In conventional military operations planners use mobility combined arms operations overlays (MCOO) to visually display the role terrain has in describing the battlefield effects. In the same way that a MCOO can help describe the battlefield effects in a conventional operation, demographic overlays can help describe the expanded or different battlefield effects in the LIC/SSC setting. Visually depicting ethnic ties and heritages, political affiliations, or the spread of communities is not an easy task, but must be done – and done accurately. Without an understanding of people's political, religious, ethnic and linguistic associations on the ground, it becomes increasingly difficult to understand the role that they may play in compounding or helping resolve the problem at hand. Without this understanding, the likelihood of accurately "Evaluating the Threat" and "Determining Threat COAs" is significantly reduced.

d. Step 3 of the IPB: Evaluate the Threat

Planners must evaluate the "traditional" military threat in conjunction with their expanded examination of the environment and the battlefield effects if they hope to obtain a realistic evaluation of the threat in the LIC/SSC setting.

If the battlefield environment is properly defined during Step 1 of the IPB, planners should have a realistic assessment of the adversary's organizational and operating principles. In Step 2 of the IPB, planners should have gained an understanding of how these organizational and operating principles may affect the operation. When evaluating the threat, planners should begin to conceptualize the ways in which the adversary's organizational and operating procedures may be used as *capabilities* for countering the given mission and intent of the LIC/SSC operation.

When the above process is employed to evaluate the threat in LIC/SSC operations, the nature of asymmetric warfare becomes apparent. How does a conventionally weaker power respond to a conventionally stronger power? Part of the answer lies in the weaker power's organizational and operating procedures that allow it to respond to the given situation. An adversary in the LIC/SSC setting will attempt to use his traditional organization and operating procedures to compensate for his conventional military shortcomings. Chapter 3 will show how Mohammad Farrah Aidid successfully used and employed this methodology against the United States in Somalia.

e. Step 4 of the IPB: Determine Threat COAs

When planners begin to determine threat COAs, the focus changes from "capabilities" themselves, to the employment of those capabilities relative to a friendly COA. Since threat COAs and friendly COAs are interactive in nature it makes little sense to discuss them as separate entities. For further discussion of threat COAs, see Step 3 of the MDMP: COA Development.

3. Troops

In a LIC/SSC environment it is imperative to branch out from the purely "green-suiter" mentality of troop analysis, and analyze the status, capabilities, limitations, and deployment capabilities of the myriad players involved. The reasons for doing this early in the mission analysis will be addressed in some detail in the Haiti case study.

4. Time

As specific responsibilities and tasks become designated, the time required to complete them must be factored into the equation as well. However, it is paramount to realize that "time" is not written in stone, and the time estimates for the accomplishment of various tasks may be modified as a more complete picture of the situation is developed. While this places a premium on flexibility for the planning staff, the consequences of not remaining flexible regarding time estimates can cause significant problems further into the execution of the mission.

5. Restated Mission

While it should be obvious that the restated mission must support the intent, concept, and mission of the commander two levels higher, this is often a problem. Crafting a restated mission – a complicated process in conventional operations – is made exponentially more complex in the fluid environment that characterizes LIC/SSC operations given the need to ensure that the restated missions of the diverse players involved are mutually supporting.

Throughout the planning process and execution of LIC/SSC operations, the missions of the various and diverse organizations must be constantly assessed and reassessed to ensure they remain nested within the commander's intent. The need for continuous reassessment is particularly crucial for the units operating at the operational and tactical levels of war. Leaders at these levels often have a better appreciation of the true situation "on the ground". With this better understanding of "ground truth", operational and tactical leaders may find that, in the course of reassessing their missions, their efforts are counter-productive or not fulfilling the commander's intent via the most efficient means.

6. Determining the Initial Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)

CCIR are developed in the mission analysis and should be refined and revised as the MDMP, and the subsequent operation, is conducted. This is arguably even more important in LIC/SSC than in conventional operations due to the natural evolution of the physical environment in terms of battle space, the force structure and aims of the players within that space, and the political situation (the latter affecting both the former and, potentially, the mission itself). For these reasons planners may not have the proper insight or knowledge to determine viable CCIR during the planning or initial execution phases of LIC/SSC operations. Therefore, it should be recognized at the outset that future adjustments may need to be made. CCIR are categorized as Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR), Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI), or Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR).

7. Determining the Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)

PIR are one of the most analytically helpful tools of the MDMP, while at the same time it is perhaps the most ineffectively used. This is particularly ironic in an age of increased information technology, where many of the very things that LIC/SSC planners may want to know – regarding local culture, social relations, etc., are out there “for the taking” – not only from CIA fact book websites, etc., but from websites set up by people in the target country writing about themselves. In cases where planners begin the MDMP with a baseline knowledge of the information available, PIR could better fulfill its intended purpose for LIC/SSC operations.

A working definition of PIR is, “what I need to know about the enemy to win or accomplish my own mission, as well as the higher(s) intent and concept of operations”. If PIR is the information the commander needs to know to “win”, PIR should logically be crafted with as much specificity as possible. The paradox is that planners often begin to craft PIR without a baseline understanding of the given LIC / SSC environment, causing an intelligence gap within the MDMP.

PIR should drive the reconnaissance and collection process. When planners do not have a baseline understanding of the operational environment, they often establish PIR that are too vague, misguided, or unfocused to produce the type of information needed to facilitate developing a viable COA for the mission at hand. Vague, misguided, or unfocused PIR will eventually lead planners to a baseline understanding of the given environment, but this is often too late, as the intelligence gap already exists. If the resolution of the information

needed to win is low or non-existent when COA development begins, the likelihood of developing a viable COA that leads to accomplishing the mission and intent is also low or non-existent.

PIR must be viewed with a different emphasis or "turn of mind" in the LIC/SSC environment. For instance, if the end state of a LIC or SSC operation is to restore democracy (as was the case in Haiti) or to create a viable infrastructure, PIR should be crafted to reflect this end-state. In a LIC/SSC setting, PIR may be necessary to determine the vulnerabilities of the adversary's military capabilities, but these types of PIR can only indirectly lead the planner to the desired end-state. It is a sine non qua to establish PIR that are directly related to the mission's end-state.

Nor is PIR the sole domain of the military when the required end state requires a combined effort from several organizations, as is invariably the case in LIC/SSC. For example, training an effective police force in Haiti was important for restoring democracy and creating a viable Haitian infrastructure. Therefore, logic dictates that the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) – the United States agency responsible for vetting, training, and certifying the Haitian police force – should have played a role in PIR development. To effectively train the Haitian police force to conduct its intended mission, a baseline understanding of the history and utilization of Haitian Police should have been thought necessary before starting the reconnaissance and collection process. The fact that, "...the first graduating class of the police academy in 1931 produced every Haitian dictator up until the election of Aristide"

(McGrady, 1998, p. 34), is information that is "out there for the taking" and a prime example of the type of information required for LIC/SSC operations. Based on this knowledge, a PIR for ICITAP would be a compilation of personality/psychological profiles of past graduates in an effort to prevent problems.

To use PIR for all it can be used for in the LIC/SSC environment, we must improve our baseline understanding of the environment first, before beginning to develop PIR, and there are several ways to do this. "Information management" is one way to improve this baseline understanding. As noted earlier, much of what is needed to begin to develop sound PIR is out there; the problem is often collating the information so it can be effectively used and integrated into the MDMP in a timely fashion. Another way to improve the baseline understanding is to ask or involve somebody in the planning who "knows". There are numerous people in a wide range of professional disciplines who spend a "lifetime" studying and writing on issues that often reflect the same information needed to develop viable PIR for LIC / SSC operations.

While tapping these people may seem like the proverbial "blinding flash of the obvious", it is more often the case that such people are not asked – or requests are actively stymied, as was the case with Dr. Bryant Freeman, a widely recognized Haitian expert and a professor at the University of Kansas. LTC Anderson, then the J-3 civil affairs officer for Joint Task Force (JTF) 180 attempted numerous times to have Dr. Freeman brought on the staff, only to be rebuffed at every turn (Kretchic, 129). Dr. Freeman was eventually brought on

board in the face of stiff opposition, and subsequently "served as an adviser to Major General Joseph Kinzer", the UN Mission In Haiti (UNMIH) commander (Kretchic, p.141).

8. Determining the Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI)

EEFI is the "Information needed to protect friendly forces from the enemy's information-gathering systems" (FM 101-5, 1997, pp. 5-8). The growing reliance by the United States military on information technologies inherently puts a technological spin on this, often causing it to be viewed with an eye toward protecting a database or a command net architecture. In LIC/SSC, however, it may be more important to know the local allegiances, alliances, and ethnic groups than to protect communications architecture. Knowing whom you can trust may be the first and most important step for protecting friendly information from the enemy's information-gathering efforts in the LIC / SSC environment.

In the case of Somalia, the question of which clans (or, in fact, which coalition members), were likely to support Aidid is an example of EEFI. In Haiti, EEFI was which elites were supporting the military? Knowing this type of information is critical to safeguarding planned actions, especially since our adversaries often do not have the technological capabilities to penetrate our information technologies in the first place.

The United States military's fascination with the electronic spectrum, with regard to safeguarding EEFI, could cause an asymmetric relationship in the

LIC/SSC environment – one wherein the adversary is gaining information by low-tech means while we are focused on high-tech protection.

9. Determining the Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR)

FFIR is defined as information about the capabilities of one's own units or elements working in concert in the LIC/SSC operation. FFIR plays a crucial part in successful mission accomplishment. Understanding the myriad players and their capabilities, as well as their shortcomings, requires a "bottom up review" before one can hope to understand how they may positively contribute to the mission at hand. A less-than-complete understanding of the former may very well lead to assigning taskings to organizations ill-equipped to accomplish them, or to establishing unrealistic timelines for their accomplishment.

When thinking of FFIR, one should not limit this construct to merely knowledge of units' or organizations' capabilities. To use FFIR effectively, commanders must know the units' or organizations' status in relationship to tasks they are executing. For instance, could the status of the Haitian police-training program, or the degree to which the Haitian judicial system was reformed, affect or modify the timetable or procedure for a hand-over from the United States to the UNMIH? FFIR, if well designed, can help the commander know how the force is progressing or not progressing toward the desired end-state. In the LIC/SSC environment, it is unlikely that the end-state will be clear-cut or easily recognized. If properly structured, FFIR can help the commander to know if he

has accomplished his higher(s) mission, intent, and concept of operation. Part of winning or losing is knowing whether one has done one or the other.

10. Develop the Initial Commander's Intent

The commander's intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do to succeed with respect to the enemy and the terrain and to the desired end state. It provides the link between the mission and the concept of operations by stating the key tasks that, along with the mission are the basis for subordinates to exercise initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise... (FM 101-5, 1997, pp. 5-9)

From this it is clear that a full understanding of the commander's intent is crucial for the development of plans and their execution in any environment. However, this is even more important in LIC/SSC because there are typically fewer levels of command between the policy-makers and the executors. Even with advances in communications and technology, there is a higher likelihood that in the LIC/SSC environment lower-level echelons of command will take action independently, and that unforeseen circumstances will surface abruptly which may directly affect the success or failure of the operation overall. In the absence of specific guidance, a thorough understanding of the commander's intent and the key tasks of the mission enables the subordinate commanders to pick a course of action that fulfills the commander's intent.

Key tasks are not tied to a specific course of action, rather they identify that which is fundamental to the force's success. ... The commander's intent does not include the "method" by which the force will get from its current state to the end state. The method is the concept of operations (FM 101-5, 1997, pp. 5-9).

The point that cannot be overstated here is that policy makers *must* play a lead role in developing the commander's intent for LIC/SSC operations. Who

else, besides policy makers, can adequately describe what the end state should look like? The relationship of LIC/SSC to policy is much closer than is the case when conventional operations are being conducted. Commonly in the LIC/SSC environment direct diplomatic efforts remain ongoing, and the military course of action must remain closely tied to those efforts. During conventional operations direct diplomatic efforts have generally ceased, and the ultimate goal of the operation is to bring the adversary back to the table under favorable terms. This being the case, the commander in chief (CINC) and/or the commander of the joint task force (CJTF) should ensure each subordinate command understands the commander's intent (the commander in this case being the NCA). They also must remember they have a professional obligation to question the commander's intent when it is not clear (or militarily viable).

C. STEP 3 OF THE MDMP: COA DEVELOPMENT

Once the commander's intent is communicated, then supporting COAs to fulfill it can be developed. Key to the COA development process is the understanding that each COA developed is a *method* to accomplish the commander's intent. While there can be an infinite number of methods, there is only one commander's intent.

FM 101-5 lists six guidelines and steps to develop COAs (pp. 5-12 to 5-14). Figure 3, shown on the following page, provides a short description of the steps for developing COAs. While each of the six steps is relevant and valid for

| <u>Guidelines and Steps to Develop COAs</u> | |
|--|--|
| Steps | Description |
| 1. Analyze Relative Combat Power | If Steps 1 through 3 of the IPB have not led planners to an accurate assessment of the enemy and the operational environment at hand, the likelihood of conducting a valid RCPA is substantially decreased. |
| 2. Generate Options | Without a valid RCPA, there is little likelihood of establishing "what you must do to win" or accomplish the commander's intent. Planners must generate solution options in relationship to likely threat COAs (Step 4 of the IPB). Generating solution options without a valid or accurate understanding of the threat's potential response can lead to a COA that facilitates the threat's ability to employ his capabilities in an asymmetric manner. |
| 3. Array Initial Forces | Planners must determine the appropriate type and size of force needed to accomplish the mission and tasks at hand. Understanding the capabilities and limitations of the non-military organizations inherently involved in LIC / SSC operations will help planners begin to organize the appropriate size and type of force for the given tasks at hand. |
| 4. Develop Scheme of Maneuver | Appropriately arraying the initial forces allows planners to begin to understand how the force must work as a collective element to accomplish the commander's intent. Visualizing the force as a collective element also facilitates establishing the control measures required to synchronize the individual efforts of separate units or organizations. |
| 5. Assign Headquarters | Seeing how the force must work as a collective whole to accomplish the commander's intent provides planners the insight required to assign headquarters and task organize. Task organizing without an understanding of the interdependency of units' or organizations' roles in fulfilling the commander's intent can lead to unclear or unsound command and support relationships. |
| 6. Prepare COA Statements and Sketches | Available planning time dictates the detail to be included in a COA statement, but at a minimum the COA statement should describe the role each of the independent headquarters will play in the operation. The COA statement should clearly show how each of the independent headquarters, and the forces task organized under them, provide mutual support in accomplishing the commander's intent. |

Figure 3: Guidelines and Steps to COA Development. After Ref. FM 101-5

developing LIC/SSC COAs, for our purposes here only three of the steps require a unique or substantially different emphasis for LIC/SSC operations. These steps are Analyze Relative Combat Power (RCPA), Generate Options, and Assign Headquarters.

1. Analyzing Relative Combat Power (RCPA)

The purpose of RCPA is to enable planners to visualize friendlies' strengths and weaknesses in relationship to the enemy's strengths and weaknesses. A successful RCPA is one that provides planners a means to successfully accomplish the commander's intent in the most efficient and cost effective manner. The intent is to pit the friendly forces' strengths against the enemy's weaknesses.

Conducting an RCPA sounds easy enough – it only makes common sense to plan a COA so that friendly strengths are capitalized, while the enemy strengths are exploited in relationship to the intent and mission of the given operation. However, although it “makes common sense”, this is nearly impossible to accomplish without a “common” or a “baseline” knowledge of the enemy.

If planners fail during Steps 1 through 3 of the IPB, the likelihood of conducting a valid RCPA is significantly diminished. Without an accurate and valid understanding of the enemy's organizational and operating principles (Step 1 of IPB), one cannot see or understand how enemy forces may affect the issue at hand (Step 2 of IPB), which in turn leads to a failure to understand or identify the enemy's capabilities for countering the friendly forces' intent and mission (Step 3 of IPB).

The risk that planners incur by conducting an RCPA without valid or sufficient information from Steps 1 through 3 of the IPB lies in inadvertently producing the very conditions they are hoping to avoid. If planners do not know

or understand that an adversary has asymmetric capabilities or options, and what those are, they will likely arrive at false conclusions during the RCPA. Believing you are capitalizing on strength, when in reality you are providing an adversary the opportunity to utilize unknown or misunderstood capabilities, represents the essence of asymmetric warfare.

To avoid the pitfalls of asymmetric warfare in LIC/SSC operations, planners must not only have the knowledge that IPB Steps 1 through 3 should provide, but must also understand that the adversary is simultaneously conducting his own RCPA. To complete a successful RCPA, planners must visualize the enemy's RCPA as they conduct their own. By doing this, planners can take the first step to limit an adversary's ability to effectively employ an asymmetric strategy.

2. Generating Options

Generating Options is perhaps the most important step of COA development. During this step, planners determine the single most important thing they must do to successfully accomplish the commander's intent and complete their mission (often referred to as the decisive point). In this respect LIC/SSC operations are no different than any other military operations. What a force must do to "win" must be established. Once established, purposes and tasks of separate units must be mutually supporting to facilitate "winning", or accomplishing the commander's intent.

The successful execution of Steps 1 through 3 of the IPB and the RCPA set the conditions for planners to generate viable options for accomplishing the

commander's intent and the mission at hand. As planners begin to generate specific options (or COAs) to fulfill the commander's intent, they must do so bearing Step 4 of the IPB and PIR in mind.

When developing specific COA options, planners are no longer analyzing general strengths and weaknesses, as in the RCPA, but are formulating a specific method, or COA, to accomplish the commander's intent. As planners generate the option or COA they must revisit or refine Step 4 of the IPB (Determine Threat COAs). Developing friendly COAs while considering the enemy's likely responses is a hard analytical task to get right in any environment, but hardest, arguably, in LIC/SSC.

It is harder in LIC/SSC operations to visualize an adversary's potential response or COA in relationship to one's own COA for many of the reasons discussed in the IPB section. Typically, planners do not know, or do not place the right emphasis on, the types of information needed to fully know and understand their adversary. Even when planners have access to, and an understanding of, the right type of information *about* their adversary, knowing the details or specifics of *how* their adversary might respond to a given COA is difficult to anticipate. This level of difficulty reinforces the importance of identifying and establishing the correct PIR in the LIC/SSC environment. As planners develop COAs, they should refine their PIR to reflect specific information requirements they need to know if the COA is to be successful. For any COA to succeed, planners must continually reassess "what they need to know to win" as they are contemplating the COA they plan to use to win.

The discussion thus far – in terms of conducting the RCPA and generating options in conjunction with the products of Steps 1 through 4 of the IPB – is not offered as a “recipe” for success when developing COAs for the LIC/SSC environment. It is proffered, rather, to point out stumbling blocks when developing COAs that may facilitate an adversary’s ability to utilize his asymmetric capabilities to his advantage.

3. Assigning Headquarters

One of the principles of war – any kind of war – is unity of command. A clear delineation and a firm grasp by all involved of command and support relationships in LIC/SSC are particularly important, and more difficult to get straight due to the sheer number and diversity of agencies potentially involved. For PVOs, NGOs, and government agencies that do not operate under the military umbrella there has to be a single point of contact on the military side of the house with whom they can communicate their needs and concerns, as well as receive and understand the military’s point of view, if coordination and cooperation are to reach their full potential. Communication must be two-way, and the most efficient way to achieve this is to and from a single source.

D. STEP 4 OF THE MDMP: COA ANALYSIS OR WARGAMING

Each COA is analyzed or war-gamed after it is completed to determine how efficiently it accomplishes the mission and intent of the operation. War-gaming is a valuable tool for ensuring a COA is complete, and for ensuring that all synchronization and coordination factors are accounted for within a given COA.

However, the results of war-gaming can give planners a false sense of security in the COA if the enemy is misunderstood or misrepresented during the gaming process. If a COA proceeds through the war-gaming process and the "intelligence gap" discussed earlier exists, the COA may open the door (rather than slamming the door shut), enabling the adversary to employ an asymmetric response.

Ideally, by the war-gaming phase, the intelligence gap has closed, and these conditions do not exist. If this is in fact the case, planners can start to receive, or become more knowledgeable about, their PIR before or during the war-gaming process. Knowing what is *needed to know* to win is a must if war-gaming is to determine the efficacy of a particular COA for accomplishing the commander's intent.

E. STEPS 5, 6, AND 7 OF THE MDMP

COA Comparison, Approval, and Orders Production are as important to successful LIC/SSC operations as they are to any other type of military operation, but no more so. Therefore, there is little reason to review these steps here.

F. SUMMARY

This chapter has used the MDMP as a framework to discuss specific points and areas that we feel require either special, or different, emphases when planning for LIC/SSC versus more conventional operations. It is our view that if the areas we emphasized are addressed in sufficient detail, the necessary conditions will have been set to begin effective planning for LIC/SSC operations.

IV. SOMALIA CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

The scope of this chapter is limited to understanding the United States' decision to support and execute a counter-leadership targeting (CLT) operation against Mohammed Farrah Aidid as part of the execution of the overall mission in Somalia. Using the MDMP as the framework, we will demonstrate that the failure to understand the Somali social structure, and Somalia's historical development, left planners with a flawed baseline knowledge of the operational environment, subsequently leading to a flawed execution strategy. By applying the information that was available at the time into the appropriate areas of the MDMP, we will point to the flaw in the United States' strategy, which should have been apparent at the outset of *planning*.

B. STEP 1 OF THE MDMP: RECEIPT OF MISSION

We are using "Step 1 of the MDMP: Receipt of Mission" as a vehicle to explain what US foreign policy objectives were in Somalia and to provide a "baseline" of the situation as it existed as the United States became involved in Somalia.

In his book *Mars Unmasked*, Sean Edwards succinctly sums up the UN position in Somalia as:

...a massive international relief operation that ultimately sought to create a stable environment for the Somali people and address the underlying political and economic causes behind the famine devastating the country. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali backed a UN resolution that created UNOSOM and expanded the UN's mission from a humanitarian relief operation to a nation-building operation that included disarming the population. (2000, pp. 11, 12)

When looking at the mission statement above, several words and phrases need to be defined. First is famine. Famine properly defined is a shortage of food brought about by a lack of distribution and, as such, is man-made. Food was available in Somalia prior to and during the intervention, but was controlled by the dominant clan, of which Mohammed Farrah Aideed was a leader. In Somalia historically the clans that controlled the government wielded considerable control over the distribution of food during droughts, wars, and other crisis periods (Simons, 2001).

Thus, the phrases “sought to create a stable environment” and “address the underlying political and economic causes behind the famine” are highly instructive as to what the United States military was going to have to do to alter the situation. “Create[ing] a stable environment” does not mean simply removing those clans in power, but completely revamping Somali culture. Somalia has never had a “stable environment” if, by this, we mean a working government of and for the people. Somalia has, rather, always been defined by clan factionalism, thus precluding the very “stable environment” sought by then UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. An effort to “address the underlying political and economic causes behind the famine”, therefore, should have been one that took into account the Somali culture, and that worked within it to produce the changes sought. Any other approach would predictably lead to failure – in the long term, if not immediately.

This said, it becomes obvious that any plan to disarm the population would be met with various shades of organized resistance for three reasons. First, in a

country with most of the population still nomadic, individuals needed weapons to protect their herds. Second, a civil war was being fought in the north *before* Siad Barre was threatened in the capital, leading to an overall climate of insecurity (Simons, 2001). Third, any move to disarm the population would meet with resistance not only from the clans currently in power, but all clans – since any power vacuum left by deposed clans would be filled by other clans; it would have been in the interest of *all* clans to maintain their weapons for that eventuality.

The United States' failure to see and understand the situation in Somalia through the eyes of Somalis was the predominant reason we pursued a flawed CLT strategy against Aidid. Seeing Somalia through the eyes of Somalis is a confusing and complex task, particularly since Somalis themselves were so factionalized. Furthermore, seeing Somalia through the eyes of a Somali is impossible without engaging in a historical or cultural analysis. Yet nothing should have been more important given the United States' CLT operation against Aidid (August – October 1993). CLT strategy must account for the future. The removal of a leader may – or may not – lead to conflict resolution. But removing the leader is rarely, if ever, "the end of the story". For the United States to fully appreciate what its CLT strategy against Aidid could or could not accomplish, the United States should have had a clear vision of what was required *after* the CLT, and more importantly, what, if any, responsibilities the United States had regarding closure or conflict termination in Somalia.

1. Understanding the United States' Somali Foreign Policy Objectives

In 1991 the central government of Somalia collapsed when its dictator, Siyad Barre was forced out of the country. With Siyad Barre out of the country, the Somali clans that overthrew Barre struggled ineffectively to gain control of the country. In 1992 the warring clans signed a cease-fire, and the United Nations implemented Operation Provide Relief – United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I), a humanitarian relief effort to provide food and support to the Somali people. Clan warfare and civil strife rapidly eroded UNOSOM I's ability to disperse aid to the Somali people, and within four months the United States initiated Operation Restore Hope to provide armed security for the humanitarian effort. During an address to the nation on December 4, 1992, President Bush described the objective of Operation Restore Hope thusly:

Our mission has a limited objective- - to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay longer than is absolutely necessary. (Carpenter, 1992)

President Bush further stated that the United States had no intentions of "dictat[ing] political outcomes" in Somalia. The United States' foreign policy objectives were clearly limited to providing humanitarian assistance.

In January 1993, the United States passed responsibility back to the United Nations, and UNOSOM II began. Although the United States passed responsibility to the United Nations with UNOSOM II, the United States did not withdraw all of its troops. The objective of UNOSOM II was peace enforcement

and nation building, as opposed to Operation Restore Hope's humanitarian objective. Admiral (Ret) Howe, the Special Representative to the UN Secretary General described the manner in which UN Resolution 814:

...really changed the mandate for the United Nations or for any force that was there from a pure humanitarian effort to one that looked to how the country would be left, basically to put it back on its feet, to help it economically, to help it politically to become a representative government.... (Frontline, 1998)

While the American public, and perhaps members of the government, believed the United States still had humanitarian objectives it claimed for Operation Restore Hope, by default the objectives were now more force-oriented, as peace enforcement entailed the "Application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions..." (FM 101-5-1, 1997, p. 1-119).

UNOSOM II began on a positive note. The Addis Ababa Accords, a resolution by the Somali political faction leaders to end the violence, were signed. But the peace was short lived. Fighting erupted again in Mogadishu, but the preponderance of the fighting this time was not between Somali factions. Instead, it was between the UN and Aidid's faction. Tensions rose between the UN and Aidid, as Aidid felt the UN was favoring his rival, Ali Mahdi, to lead the UN sponsored provisional government in Somalia. Tensions erupted into violence on June 5, 1993, when UN Pakistani peacekeepers inspected one of Aidid's weapons caches. As the Pakistanis left the cache site, Aidid's militia ambushed and killed 24 of the Pakistani soldiers. Days later, six Somalis employed by the United Nations were brutally murdered by individuals who

appeared to be members of Aidid's militia, causing the UN to offer a \$25,000 reward for information leading to Aidid's apprehension.

On July 12, 1993, the UN responded to Aidid's acts of violence by attacking the Abdi House, a suspected command and control center for Aidid's faction. Led by American Cobra helicopters, the UN attack on the Abdi House was executed as clan elders, intellectuals, and militia leaders were meeting. The Cobras fired TOW missiles into the house, devastating it and killing many of the occupants. However, Aidid was not among them. After this attack, members of Aidid's faction believed -- if they had not already -- that they were at war with the United States. From Aidid's point of view it was clear that the United States was now willing to do far more than just provide a reward for his capture.

After ten American soldiers were killed by mechanical ambushes in August 1993, Task Force (TF) Ranger deployed to Somalia. Aidid and the Somali people clearly interpreted TF Ranger's mission as a deliberate CLT operation, planned and executed by the United States with the sole aim of apprehending Aidid.

Both the chronology and the foreign policy objectives of the United States and the UN clearly demonstrate why the United States conducted a strategic special operation, CLT strategy against Aidid. By default, the United States assumed the UN's peace enforcement and nation building objectives after control passed to the UN for UNSOM II. As a member nation of UNSOM II, the United States played a role in leading Aidid to believe that he would be "left out" of the new Somali government. As tensions with Aidid turned to fighting and the United

States took a leading role in the Abdi house attack, Aidid became convinced that the United States was the principal agent in "freezing him out" of the new Somali government. After the attack on the Abdi House failed, the conventional force structure in Somalia had virtually no chance of capturing him. Consequently, the United States had two options: to either not support the UN's CLT strategy to apprehend Aidid, or to provide the force structure necessary to accomplish the mission. Sending additional conventional forces to Somalia, while already withdrawing troops *from* Operation Restore Hope, would have contradicted the United States' policy. The solution was TF Ranger, a small, extremely capable force, specifically trained to conduct the type of CLT operation required to apprehend Aidid. With Aidid captured, the United States believed that the major obstacle to nation building would no longer be an issue – an assumption, as we shall see, that proved incorrect.

C. STEP 2 OF THE MDMP: MISSION ANALYSIS

We discussed several sub-steps of "Step 2 of the MDMP: Mission Analysis" in Chapter 3. While the IPB provides a suitable framework for highlighting the areas that planners need to address prior to contemplating *any* strategy, our discussion here will focus on the baseline information the Somali planners needed to have – and needed to understand – regarding the Somali social structure before planning a CLT operation against Aidid.

1. Step 1 of the IPB: Define the Battlefield Environment

To define the battlefield environment adequately, planners needed to understand the relevant aspects of Somali history and culture, which should have

served as indicators against pursuing a CLT strategy against Aidid. To determine these indicators, analysis of Somali social structure and overall history are necessary.

a. *The Relevant Aspects of Somali Social Structure*

Planners may have felt analysis of "traditional Somali society was irrelevant for determining the validity of a CLT strategy against Aidid. However, as Abdalle Omar Mansur (1995), a Somali intellectual, points out:

The most serious problem in Somalia today is that our cultural traditions are not compatible with the construct of a modern state. We Somalis are prisoners of a culture that we had created in the past and one which we refuse to reexamine... we must reinvent ourselves and in the process launch the construction of a new, viable state. (Mansur, p. 16)

Mansur's statement does much to explain why the United States' CLT strategy against Aidid was based on faulty logic.

Somalia's pastoral nomadic heritage is the culture Mansur refers to as holding Somalis "prisoners" to the past. Subsisting as livestock herders, pastoral nomads typically live in fluid, mobile groups. They must frequently move in order for their herds to graze. A mobile culture is less apt to develop a society with permanent and formal governing institutions. However, it is inaccurate to say nomadic pastoralists do not have a social structure governing their relations.

In fact, Somalis are hardly the only people who, having developed as pastoral nomads, retain a social structure whose building blocks are clans (Simons, 2001). As Luling (1997) notes, the clan system is "a system of groups linked genealogically by descent through the male line, both dividing and uniting the Somali nation" (p. 289). The clan system provides the nomadic pastoralists

with a flexible social structure, perfectly suited to their mobile lifestyle. On the face of it, the clan system seems simple enough, but consider the potential size of a given clan after several hundred years. At some point all clans split, giving rise to sub-clans that may not remain contiguous within the parent clan, but still share common blood lines. In the past, lineage, sub-clan, and clan fissures allowed people to engage in hostilities or alliances situationally. Simons (1997) describes this concept stating that

...genealogies record links which are kept only if kin prove worth remaining tied to: if they are reliable, helpful, and don't cause strife within the group. What genealogies really represent, then, are charts of trustworthiness, according to which connected individuals can presume that, based on past relations among their forbears, they **should** get along. Gaps, meanwhile, (which can be small between lineages or gulf-like among clan-families) reflect people not having gotten along, which then offers a historical precedent for not having to get along now or in the future. (p. 16)

Nomadic pastoralists traditionally do not bond into large structured organizations. However, it is inaccurate to contend that pastoral nomads *cannot* bond into large organizations if either the requirement (security), or the desire (plunder) is present to do so. Historically, pastoral nomads united only when threatened by others. Because most Somalis were always surrounded by other pastoral nomads they rarely needed to stay united for long. Alternately, pastoral nomadic groups that could target wealthy, sedentary populations often attained a level of cohesion Somalis never knew. The concept of "supply and demand" explains this phenomenon. Sedentary and more structured societies typically had commodities people in the pastoral nomadic societies could not produce, or did not have. The Mongols, epitomize perhaps the most famous as well as

successful, examples of a pastoral nomadic group that habitually plundered others. As Thomas Barfield notes, it was not Chinggis Khan's intent to conquer his neighboring states, but to unite the various Mongolian nomadic tribes in order to plunder the states bordering Mongolia (1994, p. 175).

It is worth noting that Mongol leaders following Chinggis Khan adopted the strategy of extorting tribute from the states the Mongols defeated militarily. Although the Mongols never proved themselves adept administrators of a formal state, once exposed to the concept of a formal state, they modified their strategy to better satisfy their desires.

Gaining a conceptual understanding of the principles underlying pastoral nomadic societies, and discussing the exploits of the Mongols may seem irrelevant to understanding why the United States CLT strategy against Aidid was flawed. However, these aspects of pastoral nomadic culture *are* relevant to understanding the more recent trends in Somali society.

***b. Setting the Stage – Independent and Post Cold War
Somalia***

Somalia gained its independence and was first established as a sovereign state in 1960. After a nine year attempt to establish a parliamentary democracy, Siyad Barre took over Somalia and maintained control of the country until his ouster in 1991 (Luling, 1997, p. 290). During his twenty-two years of dictatorial rule, Siyad Barre attempted to overtly suppress clannism, while covertly relying heavily on clan practices to maintain his position. Cabdullaahi Dool (1995) affirms this when he explains that during Siyad Barre's rule

All public use of clan names was forbidden; yet all the while Siyad Barre was practicing 'clan clientelism', distributing arms and money to his friends, 'encouraging them to attack the common clan enemies who, of course, were accused of divisive "tribalism" by the master tribalist.... (p. 32)

By relying on "clan clientelism", the structures of a formal state, as an American would see and understand these, were never sufficiently developed.

While Somalia became a "sovereign" state in 1960, in reality Somalia's colonial period only ended with the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, newly formed African countries became a prime battleground for the United States and the Soviet Union, as both countries attempted to gain dominance in the region. The Soviets and the Americans exported economic aid and weapons to maintain the newly formed African countries under their influence. As was the case with people in many of the other newly formed African countries, Somalis were largely indifferent to American or Soviet ideology. However, the economic aid and weapons they could wrest from either the United States or the USSR were extremely welcome, and were principal agents for Siyad Barre maintaining power in Somalia.

The outside resources provided to Siyad Barre's government and clan allowed Somalia to continue much as it had during the colonial period. Commodities, which Somalia did not (and still does not) have the industrial base to produce, were provided by outside sources. Somalia remained remarkably stable under this rubric for twenty-two years, despite fighting a war in 1977-78 and switching its superpower allegiances from the Soviet Union to the United

States. But when the Cold War ended, the outside aid that lent Siyad Barre "artificial legitimacy" also ended, and clan rivalries erupted into civil war.

2. Step 2 of the IPB: Describe the Battlefield's Effects

An understanding of the historical development of Somali society should have been considered necessary before planners could hope to understand the significance of the battlefield environment and its effects on the operation at hand. This section will demonstrate that a better understanding of the battlefield environment could have led planners to a different understanding of the battlefield effects as they relate to the CLT strategy. This section centers on the significance of resource control as it applied to the power struggle already taking place between the clans as the United States prepared to enter the fray.

Somalia, and Mogadishu in particular, were in ruins as a result of the inter-clan warfare in the early 1990s. Any semblance of a formal government and government institutions and agencies were absent. The civil servants running these agencies under Siyad Barre's government either escaped Somalia, as did Siyad Barre, or were murdered, or were in hiding. The prospect of the situation getting better anytime in the foreseeable future was grim. As Compagnon (1998) notes regarding a pastoral society:

...a feud would only temporarily mobilize the men of a clan for military service, after which they would resume their pastoral activities, and because the insurgent force had been mobilized in much the same fashion as a traditional raiding party, it was wrongly assumed that young armed pastoralists would return to the bush after final victory. (p. 78-79)

The scene in Mogadishu was one of armed clans, temporarily out of work, but anticipating returning to work in the near future. As Compagnon describes it, the

clan-based militias remained in Mogadishu to ensure that their political faction would be present to establish a position in the new Somali government, when this was created (p. 79).

The dynamics of political factionalism is a complex concept, but must be understood in order to comprehend the setting in Somalia. Compagnon describes political factionalism:

... based on clans because – as a legacy of Siyad Barre's regime, as much as a constraint of traditional pastoral society – a fighting force can be recruited only through clan affiliation. Any political entrepreneur will look first to his own lineage to build support, whether for electoral competition as in the 1960's during the parliamentary regime, or for military competition as in the 1990's. But these political entrepreneurs are not parochial clan chiefs or pastoral elders. They are ambitious modern politicians, former army officers, civil servants, members of parliament, merchants or university professors, who have quickly adapted to the new rules of the game of competition for power. (p. 83)

In short, the political factions existed only as extensions of the clan(s) they represented. The larger and more cohesive the clan, the stronger the political faction could become. It must be remembered that clans and their lineages would become more cohesive when members believed it in their best interests to join forces

What was at stake for Somalis was control of the government, an abstract concept that the average Somali probably did not care about and was not interested in involving himself with. Rather, it was the more important – and immediate – issue of controlling the wealth and commodity goods presently streaming into the country during UNISOM II that the average Somali *could*

conceptualize and was concerned with. The conditions in Somalia were ripe for clan factionalism, as Luling (1997) notes:

Clans had always competed for resources such as land, grazing and water, but now that control of all these resources and much more was vested in the state, competition between clans, which before had been only one aspect of their existence, became its permanent condition. The state was both the arena within which they fought and the prize for which they contended. (p. 290)

Compagnon's statement, "...these political entrepreneurs are not parochial clan chiefs or pastoral elders...[but] are ambitious modern politicians", requires amplification in light of Luling's statement (Compagnon, 1998, p. 83). Political entrepreneurs had to gain support from the clan leadership. Compagnon further states that:

...[political] entrepreneurs – who are not absolute monarchs, but are certainly more than chief executive officers – have to bargain with their various stake holders, such as intellectuals, elders, financiers, militia commanders, and even women's groups. (1998, p. 83)

There are two critical points here the United States should have established, but did not, as indicators which would have steered it away from pursuing a CLT strategy against Aidid. First, that Aidid's political faction was not an organization with a rigid command and control structure, and, second, that Aidid was in the process of solidifying his position in the political faction before the United States engaged in CLT operations against him.

Every CLT strategy must consider who is likely – and who should – replace the target if he is effectively removed from the organization or the scene. In Somalia, there were numerous political entrepreneurs vying for control of the Somali state, but Aidid's principal opponent was Ali Mahdi Mohamed. Mahdi

and Aidid were both ambitious individuals who attempted to gain power in Somalia during the waning days of Siyad Barre's regime, and both Mahdi and Aidid were jailed at various times by Siyad Barre. Although Mahdi and Aidid shared some similarities – namely, their political ambition – their differences were more significant, as Compagnon notes "...there was a clash not only of ambitions but also of ethos, between the professional and authoritarian military elite [Aidid] and the new merchant bourgeois [Mahdi]" (1998, p. 84).

The critical event leading to Aidid's and Mahdi's competition for power, which indirectly led to the CLT strategy against Aidid, was Mahdi's appointment "...as interim president on 28 January 1991, without consulting Aidid, who was still out of the capital" (p. 81). Compagnon goes on to note that the international community supported Mahdi's appointment as the interim president (p. 81). The international community's support of Mahdi probably worked to his disadvantage as he attempted to coalesce the requisite clan support for his cause. Simons describes the Somalis as eager to accept western commodity goods and material luxuries, but extremely resistant to western intervention into Somali internal affairs and traditions (1997, p. 17). Consequently, in June 1991, when Aidid was elected chairman of the previously fragmented United Somali Congress (the clan-based political faction controlling Mogadishu), his next step was to use a military solution to solidify his position in Mogadishu at Ali Mahdi's expense – all in the name of accessing resources – and Mogadishu remained in varying states of civil war until Operation Restore Hope provided stability on December 9, 1992.

Taken as a whole, the cumulative effects of Somali culture, the United States' foreign policy objectives, and the setting in Somalia during the period leading up to October 1993 clearly demonstrates that the removal of Aidid was in no way, shape, or form a "coup de main" for successful nation building in Somalia.

3. Step 3 of the IPB: Evaluate the Threat

We noted in the preceding section that Aidid's political faction was not an organization with a rigid command and control structure, and that Aidid was in the process of solidifying his position in the political faction before, during, and after the United States' CLT operations against him. When planners "Evaluate the Threat", one of the questions that must be answered is, "What are the consequences that may follow as a result of action taken?" To answer this, planners must accurately assess and evaluate the threat's capabilities. As we noted earlier, an adversary in LIC/SSC will use his traditional organizational and operating procedures to compensate for his conventional military shortcomings. Not surprisingly, this is exactly what we see in the aftermath of the attack on the Abdi House.

As discussed previously, an underlying objective for clan based political factions was the control of commodities flowing into Somalia. Gaining control of the state was a means to an end in this endeavor. Prior to outside intervention, Aidid's political faction increased and legitimized its support base vis a vis other clan competitors in Somalia. After Operation Restore Hope, the United States' actions had the unintended effect of further solidifying Aidid's clan-based political

faction, particularly with the raid on the Abdi House. As noted previously, the occupants of the Abdi House were clan leaders, intellectuals, financiers, and religious leaders – put simply, the occupants of the Abdi House were the people directly responsible for Aidid's political support. The fact that they were being targeted by the United States for apparent liquidation only enhanced their importance and proved their point to potential supporters: the United States was interfering unfairly in domestic Somali politics. More to the point still, by targeting Aidid at all the United States ignored his faction's concerns and grievances. In other words, while leadership may be a factor in obtaining coalition support, removing the leadership from the coalition does not negate the perceived need for the coalition's existence.

4. Step 4 of the IPB: Determine Threat COAs

The threat COA's that logically follow from any thoughtful analysis conducted in Steps 1 through 3 of the MDMP – irrespective of any friendly COA's that may have potentially been considered – directly preclude consideration of a CLT strategy as a means to accomplish the stated mission in Somalia. The information provided and analyzed in previous sections was available to the United States foreign policy decision-makers when the CLT strategy against Aidid was developed and pursued. Had this information been properly analyzed, policy makers could not have drawn the conclusions they did regarding a successful CLT operation against Aidid.

To briefly recap, the United States CLT strategy drew invalid conclusions regarding the effects of a successful CLT operation against Aidid, and failed to

identify tasks required after the operation (had it succeeded) to facilitate successful nation building in Somalia. The vision of a CLT strategy cannot end with the successful apprehension or removal of a target. A CLT strategy by its nature intends to change or alter the future of an organization or society by removing a leader. The analysis conducted in the previous sections about Somalia's past, and the conditions present at the time of the CLT operation, demonstrates why the CLT strategy was flawed. Admiral (Ret) Howe averred that the United States' foreign policy objective was congruent with UN resolution 814 (nation building – the mission) in Somalia, and that the apprehension of Aidid (the method) was an action considered necessary to facilitate successful nation building in Somalia. But, in light of what we know of the battlefield environment and effects, he was completely wrong.

The Somali clan-based political factions were akin to coalitions. Removing the leadership of a political faction does not change common interests and objectives. The only way to change common interests in Somalia would have been to change the *conditions* in Somalia that allowed these interests to prevail. To reinforce the point: if Iraq had executed a successful CLT operation against General Schwarzkopf during Desert Storm, the dissipation of the "Gulf War Coalition" would have been a highly unlikely consequence. The "Gulf War Coalition" would have maintained its integrity due to common interests and objectives. The same logic applies to Aidid's political faction. The United States lacked foresight in believing Aidid's apprehension was a "coup de main" for successful nation building in Somalia.

Had the United States policy makers fully understood the infrastructure of the Somali clan-based political factions – by correctly analyzing the information available – the CLT strategy against Aidid would not have been pursued. Aidid was not an integral component to the functioning of his political faction. In fact, Aidid's position was tenuous – a position which Aidid could have easily lost without outside assistance or interference. Granted, had Aidid been removed a power struggle would have ensued, but Aidid was "replaceable". Compagnon reinforces this point as he describes the clan factionalism after the United States had terminated its CLT strategy against Aidid:

...Usman Ato, who was once described as Aidid's most trusted lieutenant and supplied his money and weapons, broke away from Aidid in 1994 to form his own militia, and later fought fiercely against the group led by Aidid's son Huseen. (1998, p. 84)

This example, perhaps best of all, succinctly sums up just how deep the flaws in the United States' understanding of all things Somali were. The clan factionalism evidenced here was not a new phenomenon brought about in recent times – it was "business as usual". In light of this fact, the capture of Ato by TF Ranger as an attempt by the United States to severely degrade the functioning of Aidid's political faction is particularly ironic.

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V. HAITI CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

As a result of the Somalia operation, the Clinton administration published the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) White Paper entitled "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" in May, 1994, in an effort to codify the circumstances under which the United States would engage in military intervention. Of the "six major issues of reform and improvement" that PDD-25 addresses, the first, significantly, is "Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support..." (1994). In addressing this issue, the PDD outlines twenty-one separate factors that the Administration will consider "when deciding whether to vote for a proposed new UN peace operation (Chapter VI or Chapter VII) or to support a regionally-sponsored peace operation" (1994).

PDD 25 addresses one part of a two-part problem inherent to LIC/SSC operations by giving policy makers a touchstone to determine when to engage in an operation, under what circumstances, and with what degree of support (both public and congressional). PDD 25 does not address the second part of the problem, which is *how* to engage in an operation. To answer this question we return to the most fundamental step, mission analysis.

In those areas where the mission in Haiti could have been more successful, the reasons that it was not can be process-traced directly back to a flaw in the mission analysis. Failings or shortcomings in Haiti were not a result of faulty execution on the part of the units or agencies on the ground – the units and

agencies conducted the missions *as they were given them* with alacrity. Any shortcomings manifested in the actions of units are instead a direct reflection of the mission analysis conducted.

Operation Uphold Democracy was unique in that three OPLANs and one fragmentary order (FRAGO) were developed for its execution; each focused on a distinctly different environment. On one end of the spectrum, OPLAN 2370 called for the invasion of Haiti with overwhelming force provided by a JTF centered around the XVIII Airborne Corps in a forced entry operation that would wrest control of the country. Planning for this eventuality began in October, 1993 and development and refinement continued for the next nine months. At the other end of what was, at the time, the conceivable spectrum of the environment, OPLAN 2380 called for a permissive entry of a 10th Mountain Division TF; and at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), planning for this contingency began in May, 1994. Development of an OPLAN which split the difference between the two – OPLAN 2375 – began on September 2, 1994, envisioning a forced entry by the XVIII Airborne Corps, with a subsequent permissive entry by the 10th Mountain Division. The final OPLAN, and the one actually executed, was “OPLAN 2380 Plus” – a hybrid developed from the first three. Planning for this OPLAN (officially known as JTF 180 Fragmentary Order 35) began at 2200 hours on September 18:

[General] Shelton approved the 2380 Plus concept at 0100 in the morning on September 19, and by 0300, an OPORD had been issued to the appropriate forces for mission accomplishment. Just after 0900...U.S. Army forces arrived in Haiti via Blackhawk helicopters. (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1997, p. 104)

While each of these OPLANs involved different methodology, the commander's intent with regard to Haiti (read the NCA), remained the same. This is an important factor to keep in mind while examining the execution of the overall mission by various units.

Just as actions speak louder than words, the actions of various units tell a great deal about the restated mission actually derived by the commanders and planning staff of those units. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to two areas. First, we will examine in narrative form portions of the strategic level planning process for Haiti, covering information derived in the steps of mission analysis commonly referred to as the "mission factors": mission, concept of operation, intent, and specified and implied tasks. The discussion will bring to light examples of the fallout that can occur when military planning does not take into account follow-on efforts. Second, we will briefly address the strategic level mission analysis, and use this as a springboard to address three points. First, that MG Meade, the 10th Mountain Division's commander, did understand the intent of the mission. Second, that MG Meade ignored the intent in his execution. Third, the negative repercussions and fallout that can occur when execution is at cross purposes with intent.

B. THE STRATEGIC LEVEL PLANNING PROCESS

Prior to the receipt of the mission outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 940 in July, 1994, the United States began the development of two separate OPLANs in anticipation of United States involvement in Haiti – as discussed earlier, the first was devoted to a forced-entry response, the second

based on a permissive entry. It is the second one, OPLAN 2380, that we are interested in here.

The planners developing OPLAN 2380 recognized the need for a high degree of interagency cooperation and parallel planning given the permissive environment under which the OPLAN would be launched. Essentially, being relieved of the requirement to “fight their way in” before restoring Aristide to power, the units and agencies involved under OPLAN 2380 could hit the ground running. Planning for this OPLAN, after being conceptualized in the spring of 1994, began in earnest in late May of 1994. Thus, the United States had two developed OPLANs at its disposal upon receipt in July, 1994 of the UN mission.

The UN intent – essentially the intent two levels up from the USACOM planners – was outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 940, and provided for a multinational force to:

Secure the departure of the de facto military regime from Haiti, restore the legitimate government to power, and create a secure and stable environment that would allow for Haiti's democratic political processes to advance and its shattered economy to recover. (Oakley, Dziedzic, & Goldberg, 1998, pp. 219-220)

Based on this intent statement, US Atlantic Command (USACOM) derived the following intents:

- Neutralize armed opposition and create a secure environment for restoration of the legitimate government
- Preserve or restore civil order
- Be prepared to pass responsibility for military operations in Haiti to UNMIH. (p. 220)

The mission in Haiti then was to reinstate the Aristide government, and to set the country up so as to give it the best chance for survival, while at the same

time not engaging in "nation building" per se, the latter to remain the purview of the UNMIH.

The United States' objectives that needed to be accomplished to fulfill the UN's intent came in two varieties: those as part of United States national security objectives in Haiti, and those relating to protection and advancement of United States' interests in Haiti (Niblack, 1995, p. 8). Within these two categories, there are two tasks in particular that hold special interest: the creation of a "*secure and stable environment that would allow Haitian people to assume responsibility for their country*", and the cessation of "*widespread human rights abuses*" (p. 8) (italics the authors'). Based on these two stated objectives, judicial reform and law enforcement reform naturally fall out as specified tasks necessary to accomplish the mission.

Toward this goal a US-led multinational force had the first part of the overall mission – that of stabilizing the situation and returning Aristide to power – to be followed by a United Nations mission in Haiti (UNMIH), with the intent of solidifying and building on the gains already made. The overall objective was to do it right the first time so that we wouldn't have to do it a second time. Ballard lays out quite accurately the planning process as it applied to Haiti; but more importantly, he sets the stage for what the planning process is, and how it works. His first two sentences are absolutely correct and were absolutely not followed in Haiti:

Campaigns are composed of a series of major battles or multiple military operations over time, all linked to the same strategic or operational objective. Campaign planning involves *the design and arrangement of these operations to achieve national policy*

objectives, normally through the development of one or more Operations Plans (OPLANs). (Ballard, 1998, p. 63) (Italics the authors')

Moreover, he continues:

Campaign plans are intended to provide unified focus and clear direction for military operations, and to link those military operations to the other elements of national power: diplomacy, economic tools, and information management...The first step in the joint planning process is *mission analysis*, the determination of the tasks needed for success of the operation as well as any restraints on flexibility...Once these specified tasks and any implied tasks are analyzed, military planners check to determine what plans already exist to support the objectives of the operation and what the commander's intentions are as to how the operation should be carried out. (Ballard, 1998, p. 64) (italics the authors')

While General (Ret) Colin Powell addressed the issue of inter-service cooperation and coordination through Joint Pub I in 1992 (Ballard, 1998, p.63), this issue of cooperation and coordination with civilian and other governmental agencies at the operational level has not been similarly addressed. Operational Security (OPSEC) is always an issue to one degree or another, and Haiti was no exception – falling on the higher side of the scale:

Security for the Haiti planning was so tight that only six or seven officers in Shalikashvili's Joint Staff in the Pentagon knew the details of the plan...This meant that even several key general officers, some who were intimately involved in the diplomatic and support actions for Haiti, were not informed of the work taking place in Norfolk...this restriction...would add significant burdens on those few who were informed of the details, because they could not leverage the knowledge of all their fellow staff members to accomplish their work. (Ballard, 1998, p. 65)

Security concerns were not without merit, as it turned out. Within days of the plan being briefed to the interagency working group (IAW), details appeared in the media (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1997, pp. 93, 94). Security concerns

aside, the fact remains that the lack of a connection between the military planning and the "diplomatic and support" side of the house effectively shortened the planning time available to those involved with missions that took place during the military operation and subsequent to it. Essentially, planning had to be sequential rather than parallel. With the resulting truncated planning process, those involved on the diplomatic and support side had no choice other than to focus on the major missions, and give the actual details of those missions short shrift. The problem is that the devil is in the details. A prime example of the consequences of being forced to engage in this sort of planning surfaced during the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 1995 conference. Panel members LTG Fisher and LTC Lavergne both commented that there was a "conflict between the need for civil affairs operations (nation building) and the prescribed military mission" (McGrady & Ivancovich, 1998, p. 31).

The failure to address the "diplomatic and support" aspects prior to entry into Haiti complicated matters, since all agencies involved were subsequently forced to address them on a crisis management basis. The importance of considering "diplomatic and support" issues involved in LIC/SSC missions, and in Haiti in particular, in parallel with the operational requirements cannot be overstated, since the incidence of "overlap" in LIC/SSC is much greater than in any other operation. Permissive and semi-permissive environments lend themselves to simultaneous action by civilian, military and other governmental agencies, and Haiti is a perfect case in point. Defined as an "overlap in the 'organizational space'" (McGrady & Smith, 1997, p.11) it forces the military to:

...overlap with civilian and interagency bureaucracies and organizations. In many operations, the military overlaps other organizations, many of which are not designed or oriented to work within a military context. This overlap may drive the military commander toward developing organization elements, as well a operational attitudes, that allow him to work with these other elements of the operation. (McGrady & Smith, 1997, p. 11)

Figure 4, shown below, as taken from *Haiti and the Future of Warfare*, graphically represents the diversity of agencies that played a part in Operation Uphold Democracy, and hence were involved in “overlapping battle space”, as well as “organizational space” (McGrady & Smith, 1998, p. 10).




Figure 4. Diversity of Agencies Playing a Part in LIC/SSC From: *Haiti and the Future of Warfare*

To conduct this overlap effectively requires that during mission analysis the military planner properly identify what other military, civilian, and additional

government agencies will likely play a part, based on his assessment of specified but mainly implied tasks that will be required to accomplish the mission. If this is not done in a timely manner, problems arise that, had they been identified early on, could potentially have been handled in stride but now become significant issues requiring crisis management.

Such was the case concerning the need for assistance with both the judicial and law enforcement systems in Haiti. As of October 8, 1994, a week before Aristide's scheduled return, the reorganization of the "inner workings" of the Haitian government were yet to be complete (Ballard, 1998, p.123). Ballard phrases the problem diplomatically:

Normally, the U.S. military could do nothing to help in this effort outside of providing personal security for the newly returned Haitian leaders; the Department of Justice (DOJ) was the organization that had the bulk of the needed expertise, but the DOJ had no readily available, deployable personnel to accomplish legal-reform training. In the end, U.S. military reservists whose civilian jobs were in criminal justice and the law stepped in to form mobile training teams to assist in this effort. (1998, p. 123)

Kretchik et al, on the other hand, sheds more light on the matter and gives it a slightly different slant:

[Major General] Byron... from USACOM J5 went to the National Security Council on September 11 to attend the Haiti Interagency Working Group as agreed to earlier in the year... At one point, Byron turned to the Department of Justice representative to explain just how that department was going to train and equip the new Haitian police force. The Department of Justice representative stated the department could not handle the mission. Byron immediately called USACOM, where the mission was given to Lieutenant Colonel Phil Idiart, in J5. Idiart spent the next three days working at his desk to assemble a plan to create the Interim Public Security Force... (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1997, pp. 93,94)

A final example of truncated planning and execution lies in the training of the Haitian police force. During the 1995 CNA conference, Dr. Trouillot, a panel member and relative of Ertha Pascal-Trouillot (President of Haiti in 1990), commented that it was

...worth noting that the members of the first graduating class of the police academy in 1931 produced every Haitian dictator up until the election of Aristide. Also, graduates of the police academy have been involved in every military uprising in Haiti since the twenties. Haitian history has taught us that this first para-police force, while created with the best intentions, resulted in the police-military power structure that the most recent intervention sought to replace. The question Dr. Trouillot left to session participants is how can we reconcile this history with what is being done in Haiti right now. (McGrady & Smith, 1998, p.34)

Whether Dr. Trouillot's worries will be borne out remains to be seen, but it is worth noting that only two eight-hour blocks of instruction out of the sixteen-week course run by ICITAP dealt with producing a "turn of mind" in the Haitian police. These courses, "entitled 'Human Dignity' and 'Human Rights'", were the only ones, "which emphasized the role of law and civil liberties in a democracy" (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1997, p. 184).

An additional problem – one that "sandwiches" the planning process and further complicates the issues posed by a late planning start – is the placement of a fixed end date to the mission which may, or most often may not, reflect mission completion. Just as failure to give agencies sufficient time to plan leads to either overlooking or being unable to develop in sufficient detail key aspects of their own portion of the unified action plan. Placing an artificial "drop dead" date on an operation can cause a hurried and, for that reason, inefficient plan which may inadvertently either skip, or give short shrift to, key elements of an agency's

execution of its portion of the plan. This was the case with ICITAP's program to train a Haitian police force, according to ICITAP's Haitian Operations Director, Joe Trincellito during an interview with Charles T. Call:

First we were forced to shorten the planned training from six months to four months. Second we had to create a SWAT team in Haiti months before we felt they were ready for that kind of training and function (Oakley, Dziedzic, & Goldberg, 1998, p.346)

C. INTENT VERSUS EXECUTION

Regardless of the mechanism for entry (forced, semi permissive or permissive), associated with the various OPLANs for Haiti, all of the OPLANs mirrored the same intent. LTC Bonham, then the XVIII Airborne Corps' chief of plans saw the intent as including, "set[ting] the conditions for the re-establishment of the legitimate government of Haiti" (Kretchik 1997, p. 62). And the 10th Mountain Division saw the intent similarly as one "establishing and maintaining a stable and secure environment.... [and to] return President Aristide to power" (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1997, p.62).

The execution, however, diverged greatly between what then LTG Shelton envisioned and what MG Meade did. While LTG Shelton repeatedly called for MG Meade to extend his presence both within and beyond Port-au-Prince, the latter settled into Port-au-Prince in what LTC Anderson of JTF 180 described as a "siege mentality" (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1997, p. 140). 10th Mountain Division soldiers had standing orders to wear full "battle rattle" – Kevlar helmet with chinstrap fastened, flak vest, and complete load bearing equipment (LBE) – at all times during conduct of their daily duties and were allowed to leave the compound only in reinforced platoon sized elements (Shacochis, 1999, p. 218).

The contrast between the 10th Mountain Division soldiers under Meade and the 3rd Special Forces Group (SFG) soldiers in country as part of JTF 180 was as striking in mind-set as it was in appearance. In contrast to the soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division, the 3rd SFG, commanded by COL Boyatt, assumed a degraded threat posture (which will be addressed later in the chapter), lived in far-flung villages throughout the countryside, and dealt on a personal, one-on-one basis with the locals.

While force protection rightly remains the purview of the commander on the ground, the mission still has to be accomplished. It may be argued that to accomplish the commander's intent, which – as agreed to by both LTG Shelton and MG Meade – was to “establish and maintain a stable and secure environment” required at least a rudimentary knowledge of the culture, and at least a developing understanding of the personnel within the sector. This requires soldiers to get out among the population to, in LTG Shelton's words, “feel the street rhythms” (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1998, p. 253). MG Meade's evident policy of non-engagement further separated the command and soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division at Port-au-Prince from the population, making verification of staff intelligence estimates virtually impossible, and flying in the face, as well, of the mission's intent. “Creating and maintaining a stable environment” is different from stabilizing an environment, which better describes the actions of the 10th Mountain Division in Port-au-Prince.

MG Meade's tack degraded the effectiveness of civil affairs efforts as well. The civil-military operations cell (CMOC) is usually located outside of the

supported unit's perimeter for two reasons: the first is so that the security of the unit is maintained through not having myriad civilians traipsing about, getting in the way, and posing a security risk; the second is to force the civilians to go through a single point of contact for better coordination and to alleviate duplication of effort. With the CMOC located within the confines of the Division's perimeter in the Light Industrial Complex in Port-au-Prince, the civil affairs team had to overcome "friendly" obstacles to do its job. Kretchik et al, quoted Major David le Mauk, then JTF 190's liaison officer (LNO) to the Haitian Police, as saying that wearing full battle dress

. . . gives the wrong impression for the Haitian police because it shows that we're not practicing what we preach. I think for the population as a whole, that it gives them the impression that they're being occupied, and that we are here to oppress, perhaps, rather than to relieve them of the burden of Cedras' government. Moreover, he added, the threat here, as far as we are concerned, is insignificant, and it makes our job harder by having to patrol with machine guns and flak vest; it would be better if we could transition to a different uniform, I think, for everyone concerned. (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1998, p. 181)

In direct contrast to the 10th Mountain Division's mode of operation was that of the 3rd SFG. Working and living among the Haitians, the 3rd SFG was able to assess the threat firsthand and, subsequently, the force-protection measures needed to minimize that threat. Shedding the web gear and helmet signified two things to the Haitians: trust in the Haitian civilians and military, and a degree of self-confidence. By remaining in the Light Industrial Compound, sequestered from the population on a daily basis by distance, fenced enclosures, and limited contact, the 10th Mountain Division's understanding of the threat posed derived from second hand, sometimes third-hand, reports and estimates

from its unit's intel officer. Clearly this did not give the 10th Mountain Division the same degree of resolution as the 3rd SFG, as illustrated by Major Robert Shaw (1997) in an encounter between members of the 3rd SFG and soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division. 3rd SFG soldiers working with the Haitian military in their area over several days had developed rapport to the point that both sides were working to uncover and count weapons caches while wearing T-shirts, with their weapons placed aside (p. 38). During the middle of the operation, conventional forces in Kevlar helmets, vests – and openly pointing their weapons at the Haitian forces – drove up to the compound where both sides were working. This caused the Haitians to “resume the highest level of security” (p. 38), while the 3rd SFG soldiers “instantly lost the trust...[they] had worked so hard to obtain” (p. 39). In a related incident, Shaw writes:

At one point, a conventional force commander criticized the SOF for “being out of uniform,” for not conducting what he believed were appropriate security measures in the camp and for not applying the “appropriate level of force protection.” In this case the SOF troops did not wear the Kevlar vests because they had lowered the level of threat from the FAd'H [Haitian military] at the camp. Clearly, there was a different mind-set over the force protection issue (p. 39).

There are several other incidents that demonstrate vividly the problems that may be created by a refusal of a unit to attune itself to the environment in which it is operating. One incident in particular is instructive in the use of blunt force, applied with little thought for the ramifications following such actions, and bears repeating in its entirety:

Like the Special Forces, the MPs, supported by civil affairs and PSYOP, on the whole dealt effectively with the nuances of working in Haiti. Still, there were occasions when coordination with infantry of the 10th Mountain Division left much to be desired. One early

mishap occurred after MPs and civil affairs soldiers had begun working with a FAd'H unit whose barracks adjoined the palace. There, the absence of operational boundaries exacerbated confusion over responsibilities and missions. Two truck loads of infantry from the 10th conducted a raid on a FRAPH compound in the same environs and began making arrests. Learning of the commotion, members of the FAd'H arrived on the scene. In this instance, they were getting out into the streets just as their American MP advisers had been encouraging them to do. As they did so, however, U.S. infantrymen immediately disarmed and arrested them, taped their mouths shut, placed them in handcuffs, and hauled them away. Learning of the affair over CNN that evening, remaining FAd'H members at the station panicked. Some, humiliated and demoralized by the surprising turn of events, burned their uniforms in protest. Meanwhile, neighborhood civilians, sensing a vacuum of civic order began rioting. (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1998, pp. 179,180)

Bob Shacochis places a slightly different slant not only on the way that the FAd'H arrived on the scene, but also on the manner of their arrest:

...they [FAd'H] came roaring up like the Keystone Kops, a dozen of them piled onto a Toyota truck. Within seconds, the infantrymen had them disarmed too, facedown on the pavement, boots on their backs, and rifles at their foolish heads. The cops who didn't take it personally were merely handcuffed. The ones who started to squawk had gray duct tape wrapped all the way behind their heads and back across their lips five or six times. Then the policemen were tossed into the back of an army truck and returned to sender, stamped with the misery of their enormous humiliation. (1999, p. 155)

There are several points that need to be addressed in light of this example. First, if the overarching mission in Haiti was to "establish and maintain a stable and secure environment" – and it was – then the actions of the 10th Mountain Division soldiers set back that process. Their actions directly scuttled the effectiveness of the FAd'H in that locale, with the result that rioting occurred. Is this to say that the actions of the 10th Mountain Division soldiers *caused* the riot? The answer is an unequivocal no. What the manner in which the unit acted

did was to change the atmosphere such that the population found itself able to riot. Second, the soldiers' actions undermined the credibility of the MPs in the eyes of the FAd'H, making it that much harder for the MPs to gain the cooperation of an already skittish FAd'H, and further setting back the time before Haitians would be solving Haitian problems. Third, actions of this type in a different society, one in which "saving face" plays a larger role, could well lead to the establishment of an undying enmity toward all United States personnel, and in some cases it is not unlikely that it could have led to direct use of deadly force to "avenge" the wrong. All in all, there are better, more effective ways of dealing with similar situations.

D. SUMMARY

The strength of the planning process in Haiti was that it did identify properly the intents of the higher headquarters, or key conditions/tasks that needed to occur to solve the problem. The weakness in the planning process lay in its failure to integrate in a timely manner key organizations that were to play a significant role in accomplishing the commander's intent. This resulted from multiple military planner's evident failure to understand the time requirements for non-military organizations to plan, prepare, and execute.

There was a failure to synchronize the efforts of the military and non-military organizations to accomplish the strategic intent. Various units within the military worked at cross-purposes with each other as well: as typified by the MPs pushing the FAd'H to deal with Haitian problems, at the same time the 10th Mountain Division punished the FAd'H for trying to do so.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT: A THREE-PART SOLUTION

A. INTRODUCTION

One of the biggest problems in LIC/SSC planning, subsequently leading to problems with execution, is planners' failure to obtain an adequate "base line" understanding of the battlefield environment during Step 1 of the IPB. This conclusion is supported in Chapter 3, "The MDMP and Current Doctrine", and through case study analysis in the Somalia and Haiti chapters.

As previously discussed, increased "information management" capabilities can provide planners a means of gaining both a better and quicker "base line" understanding of the problem, in order to close the "intelligence gap" – by providing that information needed to plan a viable COA. Section I of this chapter will argue that much of the information planners need to gain a better and quicker "base line" understanding of the operational environment is readily available or "out there for the taking". Additionally, the section argues that the "availability" of information is not necessarily the problem. We feel, instead, that "mismanagement" of information and failure to conduct effective communication is often the cause for planners not closing the "intelligence gap." Better information management, however, is only the first part of what we consider to be a three-step solution.

In Section II we argue for a change in the present military education system in order to foster a "synthesis" of current and valid doctrinal ideas for the fluid operational environment characterized by LIC/SSC. In Section III we discuss

training program modifications we consider necessary to reinforce the modified or re-focused education system.

Because LIC/SSC is the operational environment of the recent past and many believe the future, it is only prudent to maximize the resources available to us as a military and adjust the way we do business in order to execute missions in this environment in the most efficient manner possible.

B. SECTION I: INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CAN HELP

The innovations in information technology within the last ten years have revolutionized the "availability" of information. Information technology has substantially decreased the amount of time required to obtain information, while simultaneously substantially increasing the amount of information available. While this holds true for virtually any subject about which one would ever have a need to gain information, it is especially true for the type of information military planners need to know to increase their understanding of the battlefield environment for LIC/SSC operations. This being the case, where then does the problem lie?

Understanding the nature of the problem is the first step in identifying a solution for it. As we alluded to in the introduction, the battalion or brigade commander on the ground is often executing policy, which essentially means that he needs the same level of resolution of intelligence a CINC or JTF would need in a more conventional arena. This is especially so if the battalion or brigade commander is expected to effectively "think for himself" in the absence of

guidance from higher headquarters in the face of unexpected situations. Only with the level of resolution normally afforded to a CINC or JTF will the brigade or battalion commander be able to, with confidence, make a decision that follows the national command strategy while at the same time working within the framework of the culture and social structure of the environment in which he finds himself. Otherwise, the commander is left to hope that he or she is not acting inopportunistically in the absence of the information needed to make a sound, informed, decision.

The question then becomes how to become informed? Presently, the "system" is highly compartmentalized or "stovepiped." As information flows down through the hierarchy, each echelon passes to the subordinate echelon that information deemed necessary for the subordinate to know. Who makes the decision to pass what information, and whether that decision is right or wrong, is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the fact that only selected information flows "downhill" remains, and this is unlikely to change. The subordinate is thus left with the task of discovering on his own the additional information needed to make informed choices in a timely manner. This then leads to the first of two interrelated problems: how does a commander know what resources are available from which to glean the information needed to "fill in the gaps"?

Aside from military sources, here are four main categories of sources to which he and his staff can, and should, turn: personnel, academic writings, popular sources, and native primary sources. The one requirement that all have

in common is that they must all be current to be relevant. Anna Simons (2001) noted that a perennial problem is that often so-called “experts”, who have done fieldwork in their country of “expertise”, did so many years ago and thus lack up-to-date, local information. Experts tend to be regarded as “experts” because they are published, tenured professors, etc. The *real* experts are often the students working on their doctoral dissertations, who are up-to-date on what is going on behind the scenes in a given country or region. The problem is that nobody wants to talk to graduate students, because no one yet considers them “expert.”

The same circular logic applies to academic writings. While historical references will certainly be of some use, studies done years ago on a country may be of little use in determining present living and economic and political conditions. “Popular” sources, meanwhile, are those based on personal experience of the writer, but are not published in scholarly tomes. References such as the guidebook series published by Lonely Planet, and the Culturegram published by Brigham Young University are designed to provide tourists, businessmen, and others, useful information about a particular country or people.

The fourth source – which we are calling “native primary sources” – is the writings by people from and in the target country/region writing about themselves or their country. Often, there are newsletters or relevant bulletin boards posted on the internet. Taken together as a whole, a range of sources such as this can provide the military planner a better snapshot of the situation on the ground in a target country or region than would otherwise be gained.

The second half of the informational problem relates to educating the military planner so that he knows the type of information he needs in order to be effective in the LIC/SSC environment. Planners at the lower echelons do not necessarily have to know enough to come up with the "right" answer on their own, but they certainly have to know enough to identify the wrong answer when they see it.

Ultimately, the difference between information and intelligence lies in the analysis. There is a lot of information out there, and better information management will help, but will not wholly solve the problem. To solve the problem, planners must know what types of information are important. Once they know that, then the areas in which they must expand their knowledge of the battlefield environment will become evident. This said, we think changes to the present education system are needed so that planners will be able to look at a given situation to determine what information is needed, and then convert that information through analysis into intelligence that is pertinent to mission accomplishment in a LIC/SSC environment.

C. SECTION II: EDUCATION SYSTEM MUST FOSTER SYNTHESIS

1. Internalization of Principle: Education versus Spoon Feeding

The larger problem in military education lies not in what to understand, but in applying that understanding. The way doctrine is presently being taught can serve as a case in point. Presently, our military education does not always serve to develop the student's understanding of the application of doctrine – focusing

instead on memorization of terms and ensuring comprehension of doctrinal models as an end in and of itself, rather than as the first step toward the ultimate goal of the internalization of doctrine and the proper application of its principles. By not training and testing students on their ability to synthesize doctrine and apply it to new or different situations, military education does not lead students to fully understand the desired effects of doctrine. Military education, therefore, should focus on three distinct parts: knowledge, application, and synthesis.

Knowledge is the lowest level of analytical ability. In simple terms, a person has knowledge of a subject when he understands the meaning of a certain concept. Most military leaders understand the concept of the MDMP and possess rudimentary knowledge of problem solving skills. Having knowledge of a particular subject, however, does not necessarily mean that a person is capable of putting that knowledge to practical use. *Application* means a military leader possesses knowledge of the MDMP *and* is able to develop logical and rational solutions to problems with which he is familiar. *Synthesis* is demonstrated by military planners through the application of both education and doctrine to situations with which they are either unfamiliar or inexperienced. We feel that requiring students to solve LIC/SSC scenarios using the MDMP is a necessary step if military education hopes to prepare its students to be able to synthesize its doctrine to new and unique situations.

There are signs that military education institutions are taking positive steps in this direction. In at least one of the Captain's Career Courses (CCC), the

program of instruction (POI) has changed to begin educating students on planning and preparing solutions for LIC/SSC operations. The POI changes to accomplish this have occurred rapidly, and significant resources have been committed to affect the changes. Within eighteen months, this CCC has changed its POI from two hours of training on LIC/SSC-related topics to seventy-two hours. Whereas this CCC previously did not conduct a LIC/SSC planning exercise, it now conducts two LIC/SSC planning exercises. This CCC is now encouraging its students to conduct many of the steps of the MDMP during these LIC/SSC planning exercises with the same emphasis we espoused in Chapter 3: "The MDMP and Present Doctrine".

Exposing students to these LIC/SSC planning exercises is intended to produce a student who is better able to gauge what information is required to properly understand the battlefield environment during LIC/SSC operations. Knowing what type of information is required to understand the LIC/SSC battlefield environment is the first step toward enabling planners to better employ information technologies to subsequently *find* this information.

Part of education is also knowing "yourself." In the LIC/SSC environment players include joint forces, SOF, NGOs, and PVOs as well as other governmental agencies. All have their own language, culture, customs, modes of operation, agendas, etc. In the LIC/SSC arena in particular, to "understand yourself" means to have at least a working knowledge of these organizations' capabilities and limitations, as well as some familiarity with their organizational

culture. For instance, even among the services the same phrase may have different meanings. There is a joke told that speaks to this with more truth than poetry; the essence of the joke is that the phrase "secure a building" to the Army means clearing the building of enemy and placing concertina around the perimeter, while to the Air Force "secure a building" means obtaining a three-year lease with an option to buy.

Even within the same service different branches have their own ways of doing business which are not well understood by sister branches, and subsequently lead to confusion, mistrust, and improper utilization. The following section addresses some of these differences, using Army SOF as the example. After examining how wide the cultural differences are between two branches of the same service, it will be easier to understand why inter-service and inter-agency coordination is often so difficult, and, more to the point, why it is imperative to actively work at understanding those differences in order to minimize their effects.

2. Education of the Conventional Force Regarding SOF

The Army needs to do a better job of educating its conventional commanders beginning at the O-3 level (when an officer first 'commands' rather than 'leads' a unit), regarding the capabilities, limitations, and employment strategies of SOF. SOF will continue to play an integral role in every engagement, that the US military involves itself in both now and in the foreseeable future and in both a tactical and diplomatic sense. In a 1997 talk

marking the U.S. Special Operations Command's tenth anniversary, then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen noted that:

The employment of SOF overseas rose 35% from FY 1991 to FY 1992. It rose to 39% from FY 1992 to FY 1993. In FY 1991 SOF units and personnel deployed to some 92 different countries of the world. In FY 1992 the number increased to 102 countries. By the end of FY 1993 the number had increased to 119 countries (Kozarny, 1997).

Education early on in an officer's career is essential to developing his sense of appreciation for forces with which he may never build a habitual relationship, but with which he will certainly work at several points during his career. Through exploring several areas at the tactical level where the divergence between SOF and conventional forces are most obvious, it quickly becomes apparent that there is a need for schooling above that currently offered.

The biggest drawback that the conventional commander faces is the lack of a thorough understanding and appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of SOF. Without a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the SOF attached to him and without knowing what their training enables them to do, the conventional commander is unable to appropriately use them as the combat multiplier they are. This inability to maximize SOF use effectively and efficiently results in frustration and strained relations on both sides. For example, commanders are often surprised to discover that the Special Forces medic has limited veterinarian capabilities, giving him the ability, among others, to inspect meat for consumption (Lopez, 1999). Something as relatively simple as this opens up an entire range of possibilities for the conventional commander in

precisely those types of operations in which we find ourselves today – humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In areas of the world where livestock plays a vital role – two examples being Bosnia and Kosovo – this capability properly used can pay huge dividends through an inspection program of the local livestock. It can further assist the commander in garnering and maintaining popular support by potentially providing a boost to the local economy through the purchase of food to supplement United States rations. But, again, the ability to utilize this asset is predicated on the conventional commander knowing that it is available to him.

While it is true that this knowledge can be learned 'on the ground', learning by trial and error on site is certainly not the preferred method. Having the knowledge in advance ensures that there are no opportunities missed through ignorance. There is a saying that "when the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail." Becoming educated early on about SOF gives the conventional commander not only a better-equipped toolbox, but one whose tools he understands how to use.

Another factor negatively affecting the relationship between SOF and conventional commanders is a lack of understanding on the part of conventional commanders regarding proper employment, capabilities, and limitations of SOF. This problem is compounded by the different methodologies conventional and SOF units have adopted, affecting not simply units themselves, but units' relationships with the host nation military and civilian populations. Major Robert

Shaw (1997) specifically addresses the latter in an article on SOF utilization during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. Whether a four man civil affairs (CA) team, or a twelve man Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) team, SOF units run a better than average chance of being improperly utilized, underutilized, or simply not being utilized at all. This doesn't come as a surprise when one recognizes that the conventional commander has 'grown up' maneuvering squads, platoons, and companies as parts of a larger organization, and in conjunction with a larger tactical plan. Trying to fit a four man CA team moving freely about the countryside into his schema, as they provide their own security, and converse and eat with the local population, is difficult at best.

A third problem which arises between conventional commanders and SOF is the perception that SOF is full of "cowboys", or "loose cannons on deck in pitching seas". Several factors contribute to this perception, but foremost perhaps are the visual differences. SOF tend to dress differently than conventional troops. Frequently their uniforms bear nothing other than their name and branch of service, and are termed "clean" uniforms. Often additional pockets have been sewn to shirts, and other uniform modifications have been made to fill specific needs. Headgear is often a "boonie-hat", patrol cap, or black knit cap rather than the standard helmet. These modifications, while anathema to many conventional commanders, are often helpful, and in some cases necessary, to SOF for accomplishing the mission. Not having rank on a uniform, for instance, causes the host nation civilians and military to focus on the person

rather than on his rank. This is especially important for the enlisted SOF soldier in rank-conscious societies, where identification as an enlisted man drastically lessens the team member's effectiveness.

Group dynamics are also very different among SOF and conventional forces, and this dissimilarity is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the use of first names between SOF officers and enlisted men serving on the same team, a practice simply not done on the conventional side. To many in the conventional forces the practice of using first names between superiors and subordinates smacks of a lack of discipline. But nothing could be further from the truth. The use of first names between team members has little to do with familiarity, and more to do with operational security (OPSEC). While traveling in civilian clothes the use of first names makes the task of determining whether a person is in the military more difficult, something important in areas where the terrorist threat is relatively high (as it happens to be in most of the areas SOF are deployed). Once in the theater of operations using first names, rather than rank or "sir", works in conjunction with a "clean" uniform to signify egalitarianism within the team, which again, is important in rank-conscious societies for reasons previously mentioned.

The bottom line is that none of these divergences from conventional practices are without purpose; they are not cavalier, nor are they an attempt to "go native." More often than not, however, their practical value is not understood by conventional commanders, and engenders the erroneous perception that SOF

is full of undisciplined individuals, rather than disciplined team players. Gaining an understanding and appreciation of the reasons behind these divergent practices is critical for conventional commanders at the O-3 level and beyond, since failure to do so can cause potentially deadly situations, as was demonstrated in Haiti.

As currently conceived, the Army's curriculum at the pre-command courses does not adequately prepare the conventional commander to maximize the use of SOF. To rectify this deficiency, combat-arms officer's advanced courses, as well as the battalion and brigade pre-command courses, should reassess the SOF portion of their curriculum, and incorporate a SOF NCO as a cadre member. The battalion and brigade pre-command courses should incorporate a trip to Ft. Bragg for briefings by seated commanders within United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). These briefings should cover mission profiles with which SOF are presently involved and employment philosophies. Additional briefings should come from the Special Forces Qualification Course cadre, as well as from the Special Operations Academic Facility – specifically its language and cultural studies department. The emphasis of these latter briefings should be centered on the methodology the cadre employ – not on the end product – so that future conventional commanders gain an appreciation for the culture of SOF, as well as for SOF's tactical and technical abilities. With the ever-increasing use of SOF in

conjunction with conventional forces, we can no longer afford to ignore the shortcomings of this aspect of our commanders' education.

D. SECTION III: TRAINING MUST REINFORCE THE EDUCATION

Getting the appropriate information into the hands of the decision makers and the executors, ensuring decision makers and executors know how to integrate the information into the operational setting at hand, and knowing the operating capabilities of the units and organizations involved in LIC/SSC, are all steps toward improving our efficiency in LIC/SSC operations. But at the same time, in order to ensure a marked improvement in the conduct of LIC/SSC operations, we must model our training to replicate the complex environments normally associated with LIC/SSC operations.

If training does not reinforce what has been learned through education, the findings of inter-agency panels, or organizational re-design regarding the conduct of LIC/SSC operations, there is little hope that the efficiency of these types of operations will increase in the future. Training is necessary to change peoples' beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions. Without training people will soon discount any education they have received on the conduct of LIC/SSC operations. Additionally, without realistic training, we will not create the appropriate systems we need in order to be successful. It is a vicious cycle, known all too well to those in the military: people know what needs to happen (in this case, often learned the hard way doing real world LIC/SSC operations), but

because what is needed is not emphasized through training, the modifications required to get better at it are never made.

LIC/SSC operations present a paradox wherein increasingly lower levels of command have the ability to impact strategic success and failure, while these same lower levels of command are not being resourced, nor are they provided the command authority to impact the LIC/SSC operation in a positive manner. A short vignette will help to reinforce and illustrate this point. During Operation Restore Hope, LTC Edward Anderson, then the XVIII Airborne Corps G5, related the following problem he encountered as a member of the JTF-180 planning staff:

. . . [we] told them [the ACOM staff] over, and over, and over again, it is not our job to do the interagency coordination, please get us these answers! And we talked until we were blue in the face – identifying requirements; identifying requests for information; identifying things that were needed. Answers we had to have. (Hayden, 1994, p. 299)

Moreover, he said:

By definition, an Army Corps does not have the access to the interagency and to the workings of the interagency that the theater CINC must by definition have....XVIII Airborne Corps does not have a political adviser. ICNC USACOM had a political adviser who is, oh by the way, a fully qualified ambassador. We don't have anything even close to that. The closest thing we have to a political adviser, in the XVIII Corps, is the Staff Judge Advocate and the G5... (Hayden, 1994, p. 298)

Here was a corps-level CA officer who knew what to do, knew who he needed help from in order to do it, but was unable to "talk" or effectively coordinate and

work with the people he needed to (in this case the ACOM staff) to get the job done.

What does the above vignette tell us about how we need to structure our training so that it replicates some of the issues often associated with LIC/SSC operations?

To begin with, that training must be structured so organizational issues *will* have a direct causal effect on the success or failure of the mission. This will reinforce the significance of gaining the type of understanding that planners must obtain during Step 1 of the IPB, Describe the Battlefield Environment. Second, mission success or failure should also correlate to how well CA, interagency, SOF, etc., are integrated into the lead unit's "game plan." If, in a training environment, the mission or operation is considered successful, but the "other" agencies were not integrated into the plan or execution, then the training scenario nine times out of ten did not properly replicate the LIC/SSC environment. For example, let us say that a unit in training conducts a textbook example of an airfield seizure, but in the process of doing so the unit fails to effectively deal with displaced civilians. In the conventional arena, this might pass as a success. But in the LIC/SSC environment the unit should receive failing marks. Why? Because in an actual situation these same displaced civilians, if not adequately compensated or taken care of, are likely recruits for the very insurgency we have been sent to counter.

When we create a training environment that mandates that lower level commanders must integrate "others" if they want the mission to succeed, the problems that currently exist but are otherwise glossed over with regard to command and support relationships will be exposed, and therefore can be fixed before they have the opportunity to add to the "frictions" of a real world operation. Also, after commanders start "losing", and realize they do not have access to the resources they need to "win" because they themselves are ignored by *their* higher headquarters (as was the case with LTC Anderson) the "system" will no longer be able to skirt the issue of re-examining information flows, and eventually we will see a LIC/SSC-appropriate fix.

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VII. CONCLUSIONS

Despite what many may think, our doctrine is not only sufficient to enable planners and commanders alike to deal effectively with operations in the LIC/SSC environment, but the MDMP remains as valid for these sorts of operations as it does for the mid to high intensity spectrum of conflict in more conventional operations. What we set out to demonstrate in this thesis is that it is not the doctrine that has failed us in recent tests (e.g., Haiti and Somalia) but that military planners and commanders have failed to properly apply doctrine to the situations they found facing them.

In the Haiti case study, for instance, we saw a subordinate commander ignore the intent of his higher, evidently choosing to view mission success as having all soldiers in the proper uniform at all times, and doing everything possible to prevent any serious incident from occurring during his unit's time in-country. In his view, mission success did not include *creating* a stable environment. Rather, he clearly believed that the mere fact of his presence on the ground was sufficient to maintain stability *in* the environment. This mistaken view of success was not the fault of "doctrine", nor was it indicative in any way of an inability on the part of conventional soldiers to prosecute LIC/SSC missions. The blame must, instead, fall on the shoulders of the commander who miscalculated during the planning process.

The Somalia case study offers an even more pointed example of how an incorrect assessment of primarily both the battlefield effects and environment led

to the flawed notion that a CLT mission against Aidid would go a long way to solve what was thought to be *the* problem in Somalia. Once again, “doctrine” was not at fault. As we have demonstrated, had the right information been “plugged into” the MDMP and analyzed properly, the MDMP would have provided a suitable framework for helping the planners and commanders work toward a viable solution for Somalia – or at least they would have understood what *not* to do.

We thus believe that the solution lies not in changing the tools available, but in improving the expertise and judgment of the individuals wielding them. Education reinforced by training – beginning early in an officer’s career and carried on throughout – is key to developing the necessary expertise. We, as a military, cannot afford to continue parroting the hackneyed assertion that “our job is to fight our country’s wars” as though this is sufficient to exclude all other missions from our purview. At the time of this writing it is 2001. The United States has been involved in numerous operations involving the nation’s military in some form or capacity in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo in the ten years since Operations Desert Storm, our last conventional conflict. Even in the fifteen years, between the end of Vietnam in 1975 and Operation Desert Shield in 1990, we engaged in numerous non-conventional operations as well, not the least of which was the counter-insurgency (LIC) operation in El Salvador. If the recent past or current prognostications are any guide, LIC/SSC operations will likely form the largest part of our collective military’s missions for the foreseeable

future. We, as a professional military and Americans, owe it to ourselves and our country to train, plan, and educate accordingly.

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